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INTRODUCTION
The development of the United States' 9-1-1 system remains a
public policy success story. This success masks, however, the system's
vulnerabilities and its failure to keep up with technological change. In
particular, our 9-1-1 system was not designed for a world of dynamic
technologies such as Voice over Internet Protocol ("VoIP"). To update
our 9-1-1 system for today's communications marketplace thus requires
changes in technology, governance, and funding strategies.
Many citizens do not realize that our 9-1-1 system is only two
generations old. In 1968, at the outset of the effort to establish 9-1-1 as
the emergency number in the United States, Life magazine observed, "It
won't be long before 911 takes over as the most memorable trio of digits
in American culture."' Today, this is largely the case. Wherever an
individual needs help, a call to 9-1-1 almost always goes through and, in
many cases, also reports the caller's telephone number and location to the
9-1-1 operator. Notably, an estimated 99 percent of the population and
96 percent of the geographic United States have access to at least basic 9-
1-1 services.' Most importantly, the success of our 9-1-1 system has
saved numerous lives. Due to the system's success over the past four
decades, American citizens now reasonably expect access to 9-1-1 as a
critical public service that is ubiquitous and reliable.
The 9-1-1 system's success to date belies the fact that its core
premises will not continue to serve it effectively and it has come to a
critical juncture. In particular, the balkanized nature of 9-1-1 systems
that differ across jurisdictions and are supported by Byzantine funding
mechanisms obscure a simple but profound development: our nation's
emergency communications system is not keeping up with or taking
advantage of technological change. The original provision of 9-1-1 arose
in a world where a single carrier (AT&T in most cases) provided service
to customers using analog voice connections from fixed locations.
Today, by contrast, there are a multiplicity of providers, almost all of
which use digital technology and many of which offer "nomadic" or
mobile services. In response to technological innovation, our current 9-
1-1 infrastructure is a clever but "jury-rigged" system that uses yesterday's
technology to provide service in a world very different than that for
which it was designed. Indeed, the limits of the legacy technology used
1. Letter from Lee Loevinger, Def. Comm'r, FCC, to Hon. Joseph A. Califano, Jr.,
Special Assistant to the President, The White House Office (Mar. 7, 1968) (on file at the
Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and Museum), available at
http://www.911dispatch.com/911/history/loevingerletterl.html.
2. E9-1-1 Institute, The Issues, http://www.e9l1institute.org/thelssues/index.html (last
visited May 10, 2008).
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in emergency communications can be best understood by viewing today's
9-1-1 system as an analog island in a digital sea. To be sure, the
ingenuity of the engineers who have stretched the current system to
accommodate wireless telephony and other services is admirable. But
policymakers must recognize that the system is stretched to its limits and
change is required.
In the telecommunications industry overall, competitive forces and
technological innovations have ushered in an era of digital, mobile, and
often Internet Protocol-based communications capabilities. At the same
time, limited competition in portions of the 9-1-1 system and analog
bottlenecks have conspired to restrain the capabilities of today's 9-1-1
systems. Because the system continues to work and policymakers largely
do not appreciate the system's technological limitations, decision makers
not only fail to focus on this challenge, but instead are all too willing to
raid 9-1-1 funds to put them to other uses. Accordingly, our emergency
communications networks are unable to accommodate what is
increasingly viewed as basic functionality inherent in many of today's
advanced technologies. These include, for example, the ability to receive
photos from a scene or the ability to receive text messages, as students
attempting to text message 9-1-1 during the recent Virginia Tech
tragedy realized when their messages did not go through. This chasm
between the capabilities of modern networks and today's 9-1-1 system
needs to be bridged. Put differently, it is a grave policy failure that,
compared to state-of-the art commercial networks, our emergency
communications networks are less efficient, less technologically
advanced, and, as a consequence, less able to provide the public with the
level of protection it deserves.3
This Article sets forth a coherent vision for reforming the state of 9-
1-1 services. Notably, the United States' 9-1-1 "system" is hardly a
monolith and prescriptions for its evolution cannot be reduced to simple
"one size fits all" solutions. In practice, the system is comprised of
numerous jurisdictions (including over 6000 Public Safety Answering
Points ("PSAPs")); a myriad of governance structures and controls which
vary across state, county, and local jurisdictions; a ballooning number of
service providers; and a diversity of funding amounts and models that
differ across jurisdictional boundaries. The result, not surprisingly, is a
fractured and complicated system where policy is highly contingent on
3. As a New York Times article observed: the 9-1-1 "system has not kept pace with the
nation's rapidly changing communication habits. As it ages, it is cracking, with problems like
system overload, understaffing, misrouted calls and bug-ridden databases leading to
unanswered calls and dangerous errors." Shaila Dewan, An S 0 S for 911 Systems in an Age
ofHigh-Tech, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2007, at Al.
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parochial and often political perspectives. 4
Even with such a wide ambit of variability, however, it is important
for policymakers to appreciate the basic weaknesses of our current system
of 9-1-1 and the clear directions for reform. Accordingly, with this goal
in mind, this Article serves as a compendium that integrates technology,
governance, and funding perspectives into a comprehensive call for
reform. By so doing, we hope that this Article will draw attention to the
importance of coordinated decision making and improved funding
models in upgrading the state of 9-1-1 system capabilities in the United
States.
In developing our recommendations, we conducted a thorough
research effort that involved reaching out to a large number of
stakeholders, ranging from public safety answering points to state
regulatory commissions to affected companies.' Additionally, we
canvassed relevant government reports and audits, industry publications
and materials, secondary literature, and technical materials. In total, our
research pointed clearly to a number of best practices and suggestions.
Stated simply, the essence of our recommendations is that: (1) clear
leadership and vision is needed to move the 9-1-1 system to a next
generation architecture; (2) leadership requires, most notably, more
effective state oversight to provide both funding and logistical support;
and (3) localities should remain responsible for providing access to 9-1-1,
but that they must be supported from higher levels of government as well
as industry to exercise that responsibility. On the last point, we must
emphasize that it is critical that federal and state governments, in
conjunction with 9-1-1 technology leaders, help develop the necessary
statement of requirements and standards for a new 9-1-1 technological
architecture as well as provide the tools for local or regional PSAPs to
utilize advanced technologies.
Following this Introduction, Part I of this Article discusses the
4. Other fractured but related information systems face similar policy challenges.
Indeed, emergency communications represents only one area of government services
attempting to improve collaboration across jurisdictions in order to better realize technology
benefits. See CTR. FOR TECH. IN GOV'T, UNIV. AT ALBANY, SUNY, NEW MODELS OF
COLLABORATION: AN OVERVIEW 1 (2004), available at
http://www.ctg.albany.edu/pubications/reports/new models-exec/newmodels exec.pdf
(analyzing instances where "government reform and new technologies has opened new
opportunities to redesign public services").
5. In particular, we interviewed officials from 21 states (Alabama, California, Colorado,
Indiana, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Mexico, North
Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia,
Washington, and West Virginia), a leading consultant (L. Robert Kimball), service providers
(Comcast, ( vest, Skype, T-Mobile, Verizon Wireless, and Vonage), vendors (Cisco, Intrado,
Neustar, and Plant CML), associations (E911 Institute, Comcare, CTIA, and NENA), and
the federal government (Department of Transportation).
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history of 9-1-1. Part II details the traditional architecture of the 9-1-1
system and outlines the opportunities created by a next generation
architecture. In laying the two models side-by-side, we do not believe
that policymakers have a choice whether or not to migrate to an
advanced technology platform. The rationale for doing so is simply
overwhelming. Thus, the relevant questions are how soon will such a
transition take place and how will it take place? The first question is one
of political will and awareness, partially explained by the fact that
policymakers have remained in the dark about just how stressed and
limited our 9-1-1 system is. The second set of questions focuses on the
challenges in terms of governance and funding reforms necessary to
upgrade our 9-1-1 capabilities and services.
In terms of the development of a 9-1-1 system, it is critical that
state governments appreciate and seek to demonstrate to localities the
value of next generation technologies. In so doing, they can provide
critical leadership and funding sources to enable the development of a
next generation 9-1-1 system ("NG9-1-1"). Specific to state leadership,
as we explain in Part III, states need to examine their models of
governance to ensure that they provide the support, guidance, and
oversight necessary to facilitate the transition to NG9-1-1. On the
matter of funding examined in Part IV, we detail the current state of the
system and note the often irrational funding strategies to support 9-1-1.
Significantly, we do not believe that, on the whole, the amount of money
being raised is necessarily insufficient, but rather that the funding
procedures and strategies now in place are often not well conceived, fail
to adequately promote capital expenditures, and are ineffectively directed
to facilitate an expedient transition to a new technological architecture.
In short, there is an important opportunity for thoughtful leadership
and vigilant policy reform that will serve the goals of 9-1-1 emergency
response far more effectively than the policies currently in place. We
believe that the time for action is now.
I. THE HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF 9-1-16
Today's telephone subscribers expect to be able to dial 9-1-1 to
obtain emergency assistance from their local law enforcement, fire, and
emergency medical services (collectively, "First Responders"). As
consumers increasingly adopt wireless phones, Voice over Internet
Protocol ("VoIP") services, and other advanced communications
technologies, they generally expect that such services will enable them to
reach 9-1-1 just as they can from an ordinary landline telephone. This
6. We acknowledge Valerie Yates for her helpful research and assistance in drafting this
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consumer expectation, however, also underscores a grave source of
concern for policymakers and industry professionals: because consumers
are often unaware of the limitations of 9-1-1 service in various
geographic areas or with respect to certain technologies, they are apt to
be disappointed-and left in the lurch-when such technologies fail to
reach 9-1-1 or provide the precise location of the caller. The recent
tragedy at Virginia Tech, for example, reinforced the weakness of our
current 9-1-1 system, as students attempting to text message 9-1-1 were
disappointed to find that our 9-1-1 system has yet to embrace this
functionality.
With the development of residential telephone service, the
telephone became a lifeline for subscribers needing emergency assistance.
Before the implementation of the 9-1-1 dialing code, however, it was not
always clear which authority to call or which telephone number to use.
In 1967, President Johnson's Commission on Law Enforcement and
Administration of Justice issued a report (the "Johnson Commission
Article") observing that:
When trying to call the police from an ordinary telephone, a person
is faced with a bewildering array of police jurisdictions and associated
telephone numbers. In the Los Angeles area alone, there are 50
different telephone numbers that reach police departments within
Los Angeles County. It should be possible to use a single telephone
number to reach the appropriate police department (or some other
emergency center) directly.7
For reasons of expedience, subscribers commonly dialed "0" to reach
the operator and ask for help. The operator would then determine the
appropriate authority-generally, a PSAP-and transfer the call. At
that time, telephone companies advertised the emergency calling service
provided by their operators, which reinforced the importance of access to
emergency services. Although this practice made it easy to remember
what number to call, the use of operator-assisted dialing wasted valuable
time because these calls were not prioritized over the other calls requiring
the operator's assistance. Moreover, operators were generally not trained
as thoroughly as today's call-takers to handle emergency situations
(which were a very small percentage of the incoming calls), thereby
introducing a margin for error into dangerous situations and resulting in
needless losses of life and property.
To enhance public safety, policymakers embraced the concept of a
single, memorable, emergency calling code in the late 1960s. In
7. INST. FOR DEF. ANALYSES, TASK FORCE REPORT: SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
(1967), available athttp://www.911dispatch.com/911/history/task-force-rpt.html.
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particular, the Johnson Commission Article recommended that:
Wherever practical a single number should be established, at least
within a metropolitan area and preferably over the entire United
States, comparable to the telephone company's long-distance
information number. This is difficult but feasible with existing
telephone switching centers; it appears more practical with the new
electronic switching system being installed by the telephone
companies, and should be incorporated. In the interim, the
telephone companies should print on each telephone number disc the
number of the police department serving that telephone's location.
8
Despite federal support for the initiative, the federal government
did not formally authorize or establish a nationwide emergency calling
number. Indeed, Congress did not formally establish 9-1-1 as the
universal emergency assistance number until 1999. 9 The informal efforts
to spur the establishment of such a number resulted from the leadership
of Lee Loevinger, the Defense Commissioner of the Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC"), who urged AT&T to develop
and implement a universal emergency telephone number." Following
this request, AT&T selected 9-1-1 as the emergency calling number and
agreed that all Bell System companies would establish circuits that would
route 9-1-1 calls directly to a central emergency switchboard to be
established, staffed, and controlled by local emergency agencies. As
Loevinger put it: "The establishment and operation of a unified
emergency agency switchboard center with trained attendants shifts the
problem of knowing what facilities are available and of determining
which agencies are best able to provide help from the panic-stricken,
helpless citizens to the experienced, informed and presumably skilled
attendants.""
In a memorandum accompanying a correspondence with the
Honorable Joseph A. Califano, Jr., Loevinger outlined some of the
obstacles he encountered in seeking to persuade AT&T to implement an
emergency calling code. 2 In particular, AT&T objected to the move on
the grounds that it would be difficult to reconcile the jurisdictional issues
associated with having a single number for disparate and potentially rival
organizations; the company would need to incur the costs of
8. Id.
9. Peter P. Ten Eyck, Note, Dial 911 and Report a Congressional Empty Promise: The
Wireless Communications and Public SafetyAct of1999, 54 FED. COMM. LJ. 53, 61 (2001)
(analyzing Congressional action via 1999 Act).
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implementing this change; and emerging technological developments
would supersede the proposed system, quickly rendering it antiquated.
Despite its now outdated network design, the legacy 9-1-1 system
has worked reasonably well. Indeed, because the system is all too often
viewed as "good enough," policymakers have overlooked its antiquated
technological premises and vulnerabilities. As we explain in Part II,
however, the advent of wireless telephones has underscored these
vulnerabilities, leaving many wireless callers without the benefits of
location identification information when they call 9-1-1 and preventing
such callers from passing along valuable information such as photos when
they access 9-1-1.
With respect to governance, localities (and, to a lesser degree, states)
have taken the lead in developing 9-1-1 and the subsequently developed
"enhanced 9-1-1" (or "E9-1-1") services for traditional wireline, circuit-
switched telephone service. In all cases, the ability to support 9-1-1
service depends on the establishment of available PSAPs, which vary in
size and structure from locality to locality. Notably, the geographic
territory served by PSAPs range from a single local municipality, to a
large city, to a county-wide or regional district, to an entire state.
Similarly, the governance structure of PSAPs vary widely as well. Many
of them are housed within a branch of public safety or law enforcement,
such as the police department, fire department, or sheriffs office; others
are managed by an independent board that oversees a civilian force of
trained call-takers. To make matters more complicated, sometimes the
PSAP function, i.e., the operator who takes calls from the public, is
combined with the dispatch function (which communicates with First
Responders in the field) whereas in other instances, the two are entirely
separate from one another.
For almost 30 years after the Johnson Commission recommendation
to establish a universal emergency number, the FCC did not formally
exercise jurisdiction over 9-1-1 related services. With the growth of
wireless services (and more recently VoIP services), however, the FCC
has asserted its jurisdiction over E9-1-1 insofar as it has formally
required wireless carriers to provide access to 9-1-1. In particular, the
FCC enacted rules extending the requirement to provide basic and
enhanced 9-1-1 service to wireless phones in 1996. As we discuss in Part
II, the rules governing wireless carriers called for two phases of
compliance: (1) a Phase I where they were required to provide PSAPs
with a callback number and location of the cell site/antenna sector
receiving the 9-1-1 call; and (2) a Phase II where wireless carriers were
required to provide PSAPs the location of all 9-1-1 calls by latitude and
longitude.
Just as 9-1-1 technology and governance developed on an ad hoc,
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jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction, piecemeal basis, as the 9-1-1 system
expanded to accommodate more than wireline technologies, so did
funding mechanisms for 9-1-1. Indeed, the funding system that
emerged after the introduction of newer, post-wireline technologies has
resulted in a suboptimal process. Notably, during the 1970s, the initial
costs of implementing 9-1-1 were absorbed by the telephone companies
and the local communities they served. Starting in the 1980s, however,
as part of a strategy to spur the deployment of E9-1-1-which sends
calls to the correct PSAP through the action of a Selective Router and an
associated database-a fee on telephone bills was implemented to pay for
the necessary technological upgrade. In the 1990s, moreover, many
states adapted their laws to institute fees for wireless services, often to
enable PSAPs to upgrade their technologies so that they could receive
information from wireless carriers. Most recently, many states have
amended their laws to require subscribers of VoIP services to contribute
to the support of E9-1-1 services.
The establishment of fees to support the development of 9-1-1
services underscored the importance of the previously ignored questions
of who would manage decisions about ongoing operations, maintenance,
and upgrades necessary to support an effective 9-1-1 system.
Significantly, the issues around managing the emergency
communications network include the fundamental question of what
elements should be defined as within that network, i.e., should merely
communications technologies be supported, should the costs of buildings
used by PSAPs be included, and should the radio dispatch systems used
to reach First Responders be included? Moreover, states have taken
different positions on whether 9-1-1 surcharges could be used to
reimburse telephone companies for the costs of connecting to the
PSAPs. Stated simply, the decisions about how to use and manage these
funds, like the decisions about what type of funding strategies to use,
were often made on an ad hoc basis. Once such decisions were made,
however, states often left them unchanged despite concerns that the
current framework failed to spur technological upgrades.
The lack of any technological upgrade to the 9-1-1 system relative
to the broader telecommunications system is particularly pronounced
following the advent of Internet Protocol ("IP")-based voice services and
other broadband technologies. For example, early VoIP services often
failed to provide access to 9-1-1-despite being marketed in some cases
as a replacement service for traditional telephone service-and PSAPs,
which generally lacked any broadband capability, could not receive
information in an Internet Protocol-based ("IP-based") format. In June
2005, the FCC addressed one side of the issue (related to how VoIP
providers operate) by requiring providers of "interconnected VolP
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services"13 to provide access to E9-1-1.14 As with wireless services, VoIP
services can be "nomadic," i.e., a VoIP subscriber can take her phone
with her and use it around the world, making the provision of location
information difficult at times. Thus, in addition to requiring VoIP
providers to notify their customers of the relevant limitations of the
service vis vis E9-1-1, the FCC has continued to investigate what
automatic location capabilities can be implemented for both wireless and
interconnected VoIP services.
As to the requirements imposed on wireless and VoIP providers, it
is important to appreciate that wireless, VoIP, and other broadband-
based technologies are unable to communicate with the 9-1-1 network in
an advanced (i.e., digital and IP-based) format and thus cannot do so in
an efficient or effective manner. Rather, because the 9-1-1 network
continues to use antiquated analog technologies, it is unable to take
advantage of "next generation" technologies. To be sure, the 9-1-1
system has thus far survived as a patchwork of old technologies and
operates in a reasonably effective albeit limited manner. But it is
indisputable that the 9-1-1 network's lagging technological capabilities
both limit what the network can do and render it less effective than
modern commercial networks. Part II turns to this very dilemma,
explaining how the 9-1-1 system works and how a next generation 9-1-1
system would operate.
II. THE TECHNOLOGY OF THE 9-1-1 NETWORK
A. Introduction
In this part of the Article, we explain the evolution and current state
of this country's 9-1-1 system as well as identify and describe its
constraints and shortcomings. We also outline the elements and
architecture of a Next Generation 9-1-1 system ("NG9-1-1") that would
overcome these constraints and shortcomings as well as provide a sound
platform for its future evolution. As noted above, we do not view the
migration to such an architecture as a matter for debate: an NG9-1-1 is
plainly superior to the technology currently in place and implementing an
enhanced system of emergency communications is critical to protecting
13. "Interconnected VoIP services" are those VoIP services that allow a user to receive
calls from and make calls to the traditional "public switched telephone network" or PSTN. In
practice, this means that services like Vonage, which use 10 digit phone numbers, must
provide E9-1-1 access whereas services like Skype, which uses a username, need not do so.
14. E911 Requirements for IP-Enabled Serv. Providers, First Report & Order & Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 FCC Rcd. 10,245 (2005), available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/FCC-05-116Al.pdf
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life and property and ensuring our homeland security.
In Section B, we describe how the original wireline E9-1-1 system
evolved from a technical perspective and how the early requirements were
met by building upon analog technologies available in the late 1960s and
early 1970s. In particular, we explain how the original wireline E9-1-1
system was "jury-rigged" upon what ultimately proved to be a dead-end
signaling and transmission system. Moreover, we outline how the
changes and modifications to that system have failed to overcome the
fundamental constraints and shortcomings associated with the continued
reliance upon an increasingly outdated basic technology.
In Section C, we explain how the original wireline system was
adapted, and is still being adapted, to facilitate the delivery of 9-1-1 calls
from wireless and, more recently, VoIP callers. In so doing, we explain
how policymakers called for two distinct phases of access to 9-1-1 for
wireless providers-one with the caller's number and the cell site and
another with specific location information as well-without seeking to
improve the basic underlying 9-1-1 infrastructure. Similarly, we detail
how the effort to enable nomadic VoIP devices to connect to 9-1-1
services did little or nothing to address the constraints and other
shortcomings associated with the continued reliance upon the outdated
wireline E9-1-1 infrastructure.
In Section D, we discuss these technological constraints and
shortcomings in detail, explaining how they have created an E9-1-1
system that literally chokes off the use of all but the most rudimentary
features of modern end-user devices and stifles the development of more
specialized equipment and services. In particular, we explain how the
legacy technology uses a hierarchical structure that creates single points
of failure. Moreover, the legacy system's use of analog signaling as well
as its lack of broadband data connectivity among independently operated
PSAPs both undermine the ability to improve the system's performance
and frustrate cooperative efforts among PSAPs to improve performance,
efficiency, and reliability. Finally, Section D also explains how the
continued reliance upon antiquated analog technology means that public
safety agencies and the public they serve will not benefit from the
improved performance, economies of scale, and declining costs associated
with modern digital, IP-based systems.
To conclude our technical discussion, Section E builds upon the
work of experts in the field and the weight of recent analyses to set forth
the basic architecture for an NG9-1-1 system built upon a modern,
secure, digital, packet-switched, IP-based broadband platform. In
particular, we explain how such a platform could handle E9-1-1 calls
from virtually any end user device (PDA, landline phone, computer)
served by any type of call delivery network (wireline, satellite, wireless)
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using any available mode (voice, text, data, image and video). We
further explain how such a network would enable E9-1-1 calls and
critical information associated with the call (such as the caller's location)
to be seamlessly transferred between and among PSAPs, thereby
facilitating cooperative arrangements among PSAPs that would improve
performance in critical situations, increase overall reliability, and promote
significant efficiencies. Finally, we explain how such a platform would
enable the PSAP community to benefit from the same technological
advances and declining costs that telecommunications service providers
and their enterprise customers are currently enjoying.
B. Background and Evolution of Our Nation's 9-1-1 System'5
The 9-1-1 system still used in the United States dates back roughly
four decades. In the earliest implementations of wireline 9-1-1, the
switch in the local telephone company Central Office interpreted or
translated the easily dialed and easily remembered sequence "9-1-1" and
forwarded or routed the call to a single PSAP (as illustrated in Figure 1).
Except for the use of the special number "9-1-1" and some added,
specialized functionality, the call was switched or routed in the same as
any other call. As limited and outdated as this arrangement is, it is still
in use in some parts of the U.S. today.
Figure 1: Basic 9-1-1 Service Architecture
Voice
Central Office PSAP
While this arrangement (or "architecture") had the advantage of not
15. The descriptions in this section rely heavily upon the following references: BILLY
RAGSDALE ET AL., NAT'L EMERGENCY NUMBER ASS'N, 9-1-1 TUTORIAL (2007),
available at http://www.nena.org/florida/Directory/9llTutorial%20Study%20Guide.pdf; and
DALE N. HATFIELD, A REPORT ON TECHNICAL AND OPERATIONAL ISSUES IMPACTING
THE PROVISION OF WIRELESS ENHANCED 911 SERVICES (2002) [hereinafter HATFIELD
REPORT], available at
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native-orpdf=pdf&id-document=6513296239
(prepared for the Federal Communications Commission).
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requiring any major modifications to the incumbent provider's existing
network, it suffered from three significant limitations. First, it provided
no automatic means of delivering the telephone number of the calling
party (i.e., the call back number) for use in the event the call was
disconnected. Second, it did not automatically provide the call taker at
the PSAP with the location of the caller seeking emergency assistance.
Third, because the geographic area served by a telephone company
Central Office might not match the relevant political boundaries, the call
might be routed to the "wrong" PSAP (viz., a PSAP which
communicates with First Responders whose jurisdiction does not include
the caller's location). Moreover, without the relevant location
information, a PSAP generally did not have an easy or efficient way to
determine who the correct PSAP might be, thereby wasting valuable
time in an emergency situation.
Over time, steps were taken to overcome these three limitations
and, subsequently, to adapt the 9-1-1 system so that it could handle new
forms of call delivery (e.g., wireless and VoIP calls) as the
telecommunications market evolved. As we discuss below, however,
these refinements and additions were largely built (or, perhaps more
accurately, "jury-rigged") upon an analog platform that reflected the
legacy telephone technology of the time the system was first designed.
Moreover, some industry participants point to the reluctance and, in
many cases, the unwillingness of the public safety community to fund
longer range solutions rather than rely upon these short-term fixes as a
major contributor to the current situation. As a result, the limitations of
this now-antiquated analog platform continue to constrain the provision
of efficient and advanced emergency services to the public. The promise
of overcoming these continuing constraints provides a compelling case
for the development and deployment of an NG9-1-1 system.
The first limitation, the lack of a call back number, was overcome by
the adoption of Automatic Number Identification ("ANIY) technology.
As a business practice, the calling number was captured to enable
telephone companies to properly bill for long distance toll calls and the
automation of that process required the introduction of the ANI
technology. This ANI technology was then adapted for use in the 9-1-1
system. Using the ANI technology, the calling number was captured by
the switching equipment in the Central Office and relayed to the PSAP
along with the emergency call to provide the call taker with the call back
number. This arrangement is illustrated in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Basic 9-1-1 Service Architecture with ANI
PSAP
@ Voice + ANI
~Central Office
The second limitation, the lack of caller location information in the
original wireline implementation, was overcome through the creation
and utilization of a specialized database for emergency service use. For
billing and other purposes, a Local Exchange Carrier ("LEC") must be
able to associate a particular telephone line and number with a
subscriber's name and address. This information is used to create the
specialized 9-1-1 database which is known as the Automatic Location
Identification ("ALI") database. This specialized database makes the
necessary association between the telephone number and the name and
address information. Conceptually at least, the LEC could deliver this
additional information-the name and address (location)-along with
the ANI information using the architecture illustrated in Figure 2. As
other reports have explained, constraints associated with the legacy
analog platform effectively precluded this arrangement and, as a
consequence, the PSAP generally uses the ANI information that is
delivered to query the ALI database over a separate data circuit.16
Notably, under this arrangement, the ALI database is usually situated at
a central location in the network and serves numerous PSAPs as
illustrated in Figure 3.17
16. HATFIELD REPORT, supra note 15, at 4.
17. Because of the critical role played by the ALI databases, they are typically deployed in
geographically dispersed pairs to provide needed redundancy in the event of a failure. To
simplify the diagram, this redundancy is not shown in the accompanying figure.
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The third limitation, the challenges associated with delivering the
emergency call to the proper PSAP, was overcome through the
introduction of an additional, "higher level" Tandem Office switch
known as a "Selective Router" and another specialized database known as
the "Selective Routing Database" ("SRDB").i In an area containing
multiple Central Offices and multiple PSAPs, it is uneconomical to
directly connect each Central Office to each of the multiple PSAPs.
Instead, the 9-1-1 calls from a number of Central Offices are aggregated
at a Tandem Office and delivered over a single connection (i.e., group of
"transport trunks") to the proper PSAP. In the usual case where there
are multiple PSAPs, the Tandem Office performs the selective routing
function necessary to deliver the call to the proper PSAP. To do so, it
accesses the SRDB, which associates each telephone number served by
one of the subtending Central Offices with the proper PSAP. Creating
this logical association-between the calling number and the proper
PSAP-requires the development of another database known as the
Master Street and Address Guide ("MSAG"). In particular, the MSAG
links the street address associated with the telephone number to a
particular PSAP and provides information about the different emergency
service agencies that respond to that location.' 9
Significantly, it is the Selective Router function that distinguishes
18. In actuality, a new switch was not necessarily required. Instead, additional features
and functionality to accomplish the selective router functions can sometimes be added to
existing (e.g., Tandem Office) switches.
19. This is necessary because police, fire, and emergency medical jurisdictions may not
overlap with each other exactly. For example, a given household at a particular street address
may be served by a county-wide law enforcement agency but by a community-based volunteer
fire department.
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basic wireline 9-1-1 from E9-1-1. In the classic wireline E9-1-1
scenario, the emergency call along with the ANI information is delivered
to the Tandem Office containing the Selective Router (the E9-1-1
Control Office) via the Central Office serving the caller. In turn, the
Selective Router in the E9-1-1 Control Office determines which PSAP
should receive the call by querying the SRDB and then relaying the call
and associated ANI information to that PSAP. Using that telephone
number as its guide, the equipment located at the PSAP utilizes a
separate data link to the ALI database to retrieve the caller's address, the
emergency services information corresponding to the calling number,
and, in some cases, the name of the subscriber associated with that
number. This E9-1-1 architecture or arrangement is illustrated in Figure
4.20
Figure 4: Enhanced 9-1-1 Service Architecture
Cenra Note that the ALI and SR database information
may reside in the same ohvsical database
Today's E9-1-1 system in the U.S. is largely built upon the
architecture represented in Figure 4. As discussed, it relies upon
antiquated analog transmission and circuit-switching technology. To
appreciate the outdated nature of the relevant technology, consider that
the connections between the E9-1-1 Control Office and the subtended
PSAPs use a form of multi-frequency ("M ) signaling"2 that now is at
20. Because of the critical role played by the ALl and Selective Routing databases, they
are typically deployed in geographically dispersed pairs to provide needed redundancy in the
event of a failure. Once again, to simplify the diagram, this redundancy is not shown in the
accompanying figure.
21. Signaling involves the exchange of control information between the end user
customer and the network or between elements (e.g., switching machines) interior to the
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least two technological generations out-of-date. MF signaling was
originally designed decades ago to handle inter-office call signaling in the
public switched telephone network. When deployed in the 9-1-1
system, the use of such existing technology was justifiable on the grounds
that it allowed wireline E9-1-1 to be rolled out faster than it might have
been otherwise. But that time is long gone and the consequence of
continued use of that analog technology is a technologically limited
system of emergency communications.
The limits of the legacy technology used in emergency
communications can be best understood by viewing the 9-1-1 system as
an analog island in a digital sea. Where all of the telecommunications
world has transitioned to digital technology, the connections between the
E-9-1-1 Control Office housing the Selective Router and the PSAP
typically still utilize analog "CAMA transport trunks,"22 which carry
signaling information as "in-band" (i.e., audible) MF tones as explained
above. This has at least two pernicious consequences: (1) the time it
takes to establish or "set up" a 9-1-1 call is far longer than necessary; and
(2) the amount of associated information that can be conveyed as the call
is setup is severely constrained.
Having outlined the limits of the legacy technology and observed
that all telecommunications providers have long abandoned analog
systems for digital ones, it is difficult to understand why the 9-1-1
network, which carries such important information, lags beyond the rest
of the telecommunications world. The answer, as we discuss in Parts III
and IV, has a lot to do with fragmented and sometimes ineffective
leadership and the lack of appropriate funding models and related
incentives. But there is a technological component as well. Namely, it is
important to appreciate that PSAPs long ago purchased or leased
Customer Premises Equipment ("CPE") compatible with this now
antiquated architecture-meaning that modernizing the existing
architecture typically requires the upgrading of PSAP CPE as well as
learning to use that new CPE. As a study of Missouri's 9-1-1 system
found:
In most cases, PSAP CPE has not kept pace with the rate of
change in technology. Many PSAPs continue to use key-set style
CPE installed in 1993. This equipment is not computer based and
the display screens are small, which limits the information that can be
network. Signaling is used to establish, disconnect and otherwise control the call itself. It is
separate and distinct from the actual telephone message or conversation. For a more detailed
explanation of signaling, see HATFIELD REPORT, supra note 15, at 3-4.
22. CAMA is an acronym standing for Centralized Automatic Message Accounting.
CAMA trunks were originally developed to convey signaling information necessary for the
telephone companies to automate the billing process for long distance toll calls.
[Vol. 6
THE FUTURE OF 9-1-1
displayed.... In several cases, PSAPs are using equipment that is no
longer sup orted by manufacturers or is supported only under special
contracts.
Indeed, to appreciate the severe limitations of technological architecture
and how it has a constraining effect of its own, consider the fact that
some jurisdictions have yet to make the transition from basic wireline 9-
1-1 to E9-1-1.
C Adapting the 9-1-1 Network to Allow Wireless and VoIP
Calls
By the early 1990s, when policymakers became increasingly
concerned about the inability of wireless telephones to reach 9-1-1, the
wireline E9-1-1 network was already out-of-date. Nonetheless, rather
than chart a new technological course and adopt advanced technology,
policy makers often required (at least as a practical matter) wireless
devices and, more recently, nomadic VoIP devices to use the legacy 9-1-
1 system. In particular, the FCC opened a rulemaking proceeding in
1994 that proposed requiring wireless telephone providers to enable the
same level of access to 9-1-1 service as that available to wireline
subscribers.2 4 Notably, unlike their wireline counterparts, it was not self-
evident how wireless providers could determine and report the caller's
location to the PSAP. Because of the challenges associated with
developing the necessary technology to determine and report on a mobile
subscriber's location, the FCC divided compliance into two stages known
as Phase I and Phase II.
Under Phase I, wireless carriers are required to provide to the
PSAPs the callback number and the location of the cell site/antenna
sector receiving the 9-1-1 call. Under Phase II, in addition to the
callback number, the wireless carriers are required to provide to the
PSAPs the estimated latitude and longitude ("X-Y coordinates") of the
caller's device. In Phase I implementations, a set of non-dialable
telephone numbers known as "pseudo ANIs" or "pANIs" is assigned to
each cell site/antenna sector. In a mobile wireless network, the
equivalent of a wireline carrier's local Central Office is the Mobile
Switching Center ("MSC"). The cell sites or base stations connect to the
MSC via microwave or wireline backhaul facilities. When a MSC
23. L. ROBERT KIMBALL & ASSOC., REPORT OF CURRENT PUBLIC SAFETY
ANSWERING POINT AND 9-1-1 INFRASTRUCTURE SUBMITrED TO THE STATE OF
MISSOURI 25 (2006) [hereinafter L. ROBERT KIMBALL & Assoc. PSAP REPORT FOR
MISSOURI], available athttp://www.911.oa.mo.gov/pdffiles/Reportl.pdf.
24. Revision of the Commission's Rules to Ensure Compatibility With Enhanced 911
Emergency Calling Sys., Notice ofProposed Rulemaking, 9 FCC Rcd. 6170 (1994).
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receives a 9-1-1 call, a processor associated with the switch knows the
cell site/antenna sector where the emergency call is coming from and
selects an unused pANI from the set associated with that cell
site/antenna sector to facilitate routing. The MSC then forwards the 9-
1-1 call along with the pANI to the legacy E9-1-1 Control Office.
Thus wireless access to E9-1-1 was jury-rigged onto the existing
network by "tricking" the legacy system into viewing wireless callers as
comparable to their wireline counterparts. More specifically, the
Selective Routing Data Base is given information so that it can
determine what particular PSAP relates to the pANI (and its associated
cell site/sector). Based on this determination, the E9-1-1 Control Office
or Selective Router forwards the call (along with the associated pANI) to
the PSAP's CPE.
To complete the "tricking" of the legacy network, the MSC also
relays a key (i.e., the pANI information) to the ALI database so that the
PSAP can gain access to that information. In particular, at the same
time that the MSC forwards the call to the E9-1-1 Central Office, the
associated processor also provides the call back number of the mobile
unit and Phase I location information to the ALI database. Thus, when
the PSAP's CPE receives the call and pANI from the E9-1-1 Control
Office, it is able to query the ALI database using the pANI and receive
in return the call back number and cell/site sector information, which it
can then display for the dispatcher.
At one level, the jury-rigging of the legacy 9-1-1 system was an
ingenious solution. After all, the use of pANIs as a database retrieval key
enabled the existing wireline E9-1-1 infrastructure to be used for wireless
Phase I implementations with minimal modifications because the pANI
key was simply substituted for the ANI information and the wireline E9-
1-1 portion of the network continued to operate much as it always did."
While this arrangement had the advantage of allowing wireless Phase I
implementations to move forward more quickly and thereby save
countless lives in the interim, it did nothing to alleviate the technological
constraints and other shortcomings associated with the use of the
outdated wireline E9-1-1 infrastructure with, among other things, its
reliance upon a dead-end analog CAMA technology. Rather, at least in
some cases, it actually created additional reliance interests in that
outdated system by requiring new investments in the legacy technology.26
25. It should be noted that, while actual modifications to the wireline portion of the
network were minimized using this approach, a substantial amount of additional equipment
and effort was needed in order to effectively interface the wireless carriers' equipment,
information, and processes with the legacy wireine E9-1-1 network.
26. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas J. Sugrue, FCC Chief, Wireless Telecomms. Bureau,
to Marlys R. Davis, E-911 Program Manager, King County E-911 Program Office (May 7,
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The Phase II vision of wireless compliance with E9-1-1 could not
be implemented as quickly as Phase 1. In particular, Phase II required
the wireless carrier to deliver the callback number and the geographic
location or "X-Y" coordinates of the caller to the PSAP. In principle,
this information could be relayed in a similar fashion to that approach
described above, except additional equipment would be needed to
determine the position of the caller. This equipment, known as Position
Determination Equipment ("PDE"), estimates the location of the
wireless subscriber placing the 9-1-1 call both at the start of the call and,
if needed, during the progress of the call.
Once the position is estimated, the MSC receiving the emergency
call is able to forward it and the Phase I pANI to the E9-1-1 Control
Office or Selective Router just as it does in the case of a Phase I call. As
before, the E9-1-1 Control Office uses the Phase I information stored in
the Selective Routing Data Base (i.e., the information that associates the
pANI and its related cell site/sector with a particular PSAP) to deliver
the call and pANI to the proper PSAP.27 When the PDE locates the
mobile terminal, it also provides the pANI, call back number and
location information, i.e., X-Y coordinates, to the ALI database over
another data link.
On the PSAP side of the equation, the Phase II process works
slightly differently from Phase I. Notably, when the PSAP's CPE
receives the call and pANI from the E9-1-1 Control Office or Selective
Router, it queries the ALI database using the pANI. The ALI database
returns the call back number and Phase II location information, which is
then processed and made available to the call-taker, assuming that the
PSAP has upgraded its CPE so that it can receive and utilize this
information. Note that during the call, the location information can be
refreshed over the data link between the PDE and the ALI database.
The E9-1-1 network architecture with the wireless elements added is
illustrated in Figure 5.
2001), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Wireless/Orders/2001/kingco.pdf (explaining
demarcation of the point up to which wireless carriers are obligated to bear costs for Phase I
implementation---the proper demarcation point for allocating costs between the wireless
carriers and the PSAPs is the input to the 911 Selective Router maintained by the Incumbent
Local Exchange Carrier (ILEC)").
27. The call could be routed based upon the Phase II (X-Y) information, but, typically,
this is not done due to the delay that occurs between the time the wireless 9-1-1 call is placed
and the estimated X-Y coordinates are available from the PDE and associated Mobile
Positioning Center ("MPC").
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As suggested above, the FCC responded to the advent of VoIP
technology by requiring VoIP providers who offered services that
interconnected to the public switched telephone network to also offer
E9-1-1 service to their subscribers. For entities such as cable television
companies that offer VoIP to fixed devices (i.e., "fixed-line VoIP"), the
solution was relatively straightforward as they possessed the necessary
location (street address) information of the caller and, assuming access to
the Selective Routers and associated E9-1-1 databases was available, they
could readily interface with the existing wireline E9-1-1 network. As in
the case of wireless E9-1-1, the major challenge in providing nomadic
VoIP services is to determine the location of the subscriber and his or her
device.
In the VoIP environment, the providers of nomadic VoIP services
lacked a practical means of locating nomadic devices, such as a Vonage
phone that can be taken abroad and plugged into an Ethernet port to
receive "dialtone" and act like an ordinary phone with a number
associated with the North American Numbering Plan. To address this
failing and to comply with FCC requirements, providers like Vonage
have required their subscribers to manually enter their current address
over the Internet. The provider then provides this subscriber location
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information to the appropriate E9-1-1 databases. With this
arrangement, an emergency VoIP E9-1-1 call is passed, along with the
ANI information, through a "gateway"28 to the E9-1-1 Control Office
and, ultimately, to the correct PSAP. The CPE at the PSAP then
utilizes the data link to the ALI database to retrieve and display the call-
back number, subscriber name (in some cases), address, and emergency
services information associated with the calling number. 29 To illustrate
the current architecture of the E9-1-1 network architecture, Figure 6
outlines how it integrates the wireline, wireless, and VoIP elements.




28. In this context a gateway is simply a device that converts VoIP calls on one side of the
device to ordinary public switched telephone network ("PSTN") calls on the other.
29. VoIP providers are migrating to E9-1-1 compliance in three stages referred to as I1,
12, and 13. In the first stage, I1, the 9-1-1 call is routed to the ordinary ten digit telephone
number of the PSAP (sometimes referred to as an administrative line) without location
information. In the second stage, the VoIP provider participates in the updating of the ALI
database and the 9-1-1 call is routed along with the ANI information over the incoming
trunks to the correct PSAP. The PSAP can then retrieve the caller's location information by
querying the ALI database as usual. The third stage refers to the future situation wherein the
PSAP is able to receive 9-1-1 calls and associated information directly in the IP-format
without conversion.
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D. Constraints and Shortcomings Associated with the Current 9-
1-1 System
In the previous section, we traced the evolution of the Nation's
system for handling 9-1-1 emergency calls and emphasized how that
system relies upon the badly outdated wireline E9-1-1 infrastructure. As
one of us concluded in an earlier report released in 2002, "[T]he wireline
E911 system.., was jury-rigged upon a dead-end CAMA technology
that continues to constrain the evolution of wireless E9-1-1 service."30
As the same report put it, "While the Nation should be forever grateful
to the engineers and others who designed the original 911 system, it
must be recognized that it was-and remains-somewhat of a 'kluge.'"'
In this section, we discuss the constraints and shortcomings
associated with the current generation of E9-1-1 systems. It is
important to appreciate those limitations and constraints not only
because they create the urgent need for the development and deployment
of NG9-1-1 systems in general, but also because they are crucial to
understanding the requirements for how such systems must be governed
and funded in the future. With that in mind, we now turn to a
discussion of the constraints and shortcomings associated with the
current E9-1-1 system.
1. Constraints on Serving and/or Exploiting Modern End-
User Devices
When the first 9-1-1 call was completed in 1968, telephone
subscribers by and large accessed the telephone network using ordinary
telephone handsets designed to do nothing more than: (a) convert voice
sounds to variations in electric current on the outbound side of the line,
(b) convert variations in electric current to voice sounds on the incoming
side, and (c) handle the simplest of signaling functions, e.g., dialing and
ringing. By contrast, modern state-of-art handsets, especially those used
on wireless networks-let alone VoIP networks-are entirely different.
Today's wireless devices are, in many cases, an electronic swiss army
knife. In particular, these small digital devices have powerful processor
and storage capabilities and are capable of creating and handling not only
voice communications, but also text, data, image, and video signals and
combinations of them (multimedia) as well. Unlike the voice-oriented,
analog, circuit switched technology that lies at the heart of the existing
E9-1-1 system in the U.S., today's wireless networks increasingly-like
30. HATFIELD REPORT, supra note 15, at 10.
31. Id. at 14.
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the broadband networks utilized by VoIP providers-use modern, all-
digital packet switched technology based upon the Internet Protocol
suite.32 Consequently, these networks are capable of conveying voice,
text, data, image, and even video signals from these increasingly powerful
digital devices."
If our nation relied on a 9-1-1 network based on cutting-edge
broadband Internet Protocol-based technology (and not based on
antiquated analog technology and MF [CAMA] signaling), it could take
advantage of, rather then cripple, the capabilities of modern end-user
devices. Consider, for example, that most modern cell phones could
easily send along pictures to a PSAP (say, of a car leaving the scene of an
armed robbery), but few PSAPs are equipped with the necessary
technology to be able to receive and process such information. Similarly,
the adoption of enhanced IP-based technology would enable a deaf
person who relies upon the text messaging features of a modern wireless
phone to communicate electronically with a PSAP by sending a text
message to the 9-1-1 call-taker. The message could request help and
convey relevant information about the emergency situation.34
The adoption of modern, broadband IP-based technology would
not only allow our 9-1-1 system to take advantage of current capabilities,
but also to develop specialized devices and functionalities tailored to
particular emergency response scenarios. With the aid of such
technology, for example, firms could develop and market technologies
that would not only allow an elderly person living alone to use a simple
pendant-type device to call for help, but also to automatically convey
other critical (e.g., medical) information as well. Similarly, an Automatic
Collision Notification system in a vehicle could automatically call for
help while conveying other relevant information such as the vehicle's
32. Protocols are simply pre-established rules implemented in software or hardware that
facilitate electronic communications between and among computers and other devices. A
protocol suite is thus a set of such protocols. In particular, the Internet Protocol suite is the set
of protocols upon which the Internet runs. Note, as we will explain later, that private data
networks that are entirely separate from the public Internet can be implemented using the
Internet Protocol suite.
33. In fairness, it should be pointed out that while wireline public switched telephone
networks have largely been converted from analog to digital switching and interoffice
transmission, most residential subscribers still access the digital network over narrowband,
analog local loop or "last mile" facilities. Thus, PSAPs are not unique in relying upon analog
facilities in an increasingly digital era. However, a technology known as Digital Subscriber
Line ("DSL") gives many of those residential subscribers the option of accessing the public
Internet over broadband facilities that support voice, data, image, and video signals in the
digital format as well as traditional narrowband analog voice signals. In the alternative, some
ILECs are extending broadband digital capacity to individual homes using fiber optic rather
than twisted-pair copper cable facilities.
34. Jim McKay, Texting 911?, GOVT TECH., Aug. 1, 2007, available at
http://www.govtech.com/gt/127961.
20081
j ON TELECOMM &HIGH TECH L.
location and the severity of the crash. Finally, the adoption of modern
technology would enable operators of commercial, third-party operated
(telematics) emergency services (e.g., Onstar, ATX and CrossCountry),
burglar alarm companies, and remote health monitoring centers all to
more efficiently and effectively convey emergency information to the
appropriate First Responders.3"
In evaluating the opportunity to upgrade the capacities of 9-1-1
services, it is important to recognize that if only the network connection
were upgraded, that alone would not be sufficient to facilitate the use of
enhanced technologies such as those discussed above. In particular, even
with the adoption of a modern all-digital, broadband, IP-based packet
switched network (i.e., one capable of conveying voice, text, data, image,
and video traffic) for 9-1-1 traffic, PSAPs would still lack the capability
to receive, process, and display such information without upgrading their
CPE. As noted above, the CPE in today's PSAPs are generally
configured to receive emergency calls over analog CAMA trunks (with
all of the attendant constraints) and to request and receive information
associated with the call over rather rudimentary, low-speed, point-to-
point communications links connected to the ALT database.
Paraphrasing one of the E9-1-1 professionals we interviewed during the
project, "upgrading the network side of the system without upgrading the
PSAP equipment itself will only move the bottleneck or chokepoint from
the last few miles to the last few feet."36 Moreover, as we discuss in the
next part related to governance, it is also crucial that the right training
and incentives are put in place so that PSAPs not only adopt advanced
technology, including CPE, but also learn how to use it effectively.
Another important consideration to appreciate in evaluating the
opportunities presented by advanced technology is to recognize the
inevitable resistance to technological change. This Article discusses
strategies to overcome such resistance in the next part, but it bears
mention that many of the criticisms of the enhanced, IP-based
technologies are not well founded. First, some maintain that IP-based
networks are unsecure or unreliable. But, as we will explain in more
detail later in conjunction with our discussion of the NG9-1-1 network,
35. These third party providers are often forced to access PSAPs over administrative lines
rather than the regular E9-1-1 trunks. In some cases, these administrative lines may not be
staffed with trained emergency call takers and, in extreme cases, may not be staffed on a 24/7
basis. It should be noted, however, that requiring this mode of operation is not always a purely
technological problem since operational issues such as excessive false alarms may require
manual screening of calls by third party providers.
36. In order to elicit candid responses in interviews, we agreed to provide anonymity
where credible sources volunteered potentially sensitive information. Accordingly, where this
Article cites an interview without personally identifying the speaker, it is pursuant to such an
agreement.
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one can use IP-based equipment on a private, managed, and secure
network that is physically separate from the public Internet. This
separate network can ride, for example, on a fiber optic cable configured
as a self-healing ring that provides an additional level of reliability over
and above the diverse routing capabilities of IP-based networks. This
separation from the public Internet coupled with modern encryption
techniques could provide the requisite level of security and reliability.
Indeed, many mission critical networks rely upon similar arrangements
today.
A second criticism leveled by some E9-1-1 professionals against the
modernization of the E9-1-1 platform is that the ability to receive more
information delivered by end-user devices will overload the call-taker in
the PSAP with information. To be sure, this is a legitimate and
plausible concern. It fails to appreciate, however, that whether and when
a call-taker receives information is a matter of software design and that
all information need not be presented to the call-taker when the call is
received or in progress. If a PSAP was served by modern all-digital,
broadband, IP-based packet switched network, the additional
information (e.g., the photograph of the fleeing suspect or the
information on the severity of the crash) could be conveyed but, rather
than displaying this information to the call-taker and/or dispatcher, it
could simply be stored in a database attached to the network for later
retrieval.37
2. Constraints Associated with Analog Circuit Switching
and Selective Routers
Stated simply, the 9-1-1 network remains a voice-centric
environment in a data-centric world. Notably, the connections between
the Central Office that handles the emergency call and the E9-1-1
Control Office-as well as between the E9-1-1 Control Office and the
PSAP-are optimized for voice communications and hence severely
limit the bandwidth available for data communications. Similarly, the
Selective Routers in the E9-1-1 Control Office constrict the bandwidth
available because they are also optimized to handle voice traffic.38 To be
sure, the use of Selective Routers ensures that calls are delivered to the
correct PSAP and distinguishes other forms of 9-1-1 service from E9-1-
1. Nonetheless, it does so at a great and now unnecessary cost to
innovation in the 9-1-1 network.
37. In this scenario, the information can then be retrieved or "pulled" when, and only
when, it is wanted by the call taker, dispatcher, or first responder.
38. Note that this bandwidth constriction is true whether the trunks are using an analog
or digital format.
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The technological limitations imposed by the use of traditional
circuit-switched Selective Routers present problems other than
constraining bandwidth available to applications beyond the core voice
delivery function of today's network.39 By requiring a hierarchical
structure for E9-1-1 calls to be delivered, the use of Selective Routers
creates a potential single point of failure. Consider, for example, that if
the Selective Router fails, emergency calls via Central Offices connected
to that Selective Router will not be delivered. One remedy for this
concern is to deploy two Selective Routers at two different locations with
separate independent trunks from each subtending Central Office to
each of the redundant Selective Routers and from each of the two
Selective Routers to each PSAP. As should be evident, however, this
approach comes at a considerable cost and often cannot be borne by the
relevant PSAPs, with the result that the 9-1-1 network is often
vulnerable to at least one single point failure.
In reality, the traditional circuit-switched Selective Router as a
point of failure is matched by the specter that the PSAP itself represents
another single point of potential failure insofar as PSAPs typically have
no back-up arrangements-at least outside of those PSAPs connected to
the same Selective Router-should they suffer an outage based either on
their network or CPE infrastructure.40 Notably, the existing 9-1-1
network is limited in terms of allowing one PSAP to backup another in
the event of failure or in a period of unusually high call volumes. Thus,
in a state or region with a large number of Selective Routers, the
requirement to be served by the same Selective Router limits the ability
of more distant PSAPs to provide backup support. Moreover, as a
historical matter, the presence of different telephone carriers in different
areas as well as the existence of incumbent rate centers and LATA
boundaries have created seams that make such cooperation difficult.4 In
39. Clearly, the function provided by the traditional Selective Routers in today's 9-1-1
network (i.e., routing the call to the appropriate PSAP based upon the caller's location) is still
needed in the NG9-1-1 network; by contrast, in a broadband, packet-switched, IP-based
network, the bandwidth constraints would be removed and numerous other benefits, as
explained herein, would result.
40. We are not aware of any publicly available, comprehensive study of E9-1-1 system
failures. Based upon conversations with professionals in the field, however, we believe that
individual PSAPs remain the single weakest link in the E9-1-1 chain and it is our
understanding that individual PSAP outages are not reported in most cases. These outages are
caused by PSAP physical plant and/or public utility failures, CPE failures within the PSAP, or
failure of the telephone company outside plant (i.e., the local loop and transport facilities) that
are used to connect the PSAP to the E9-1-1 network. The latter type of failure isolates the
PSAP from the balance of the network and the risk of such isolation can be reduced by
deploying redundant, diverse physical routes into and out of the building housing the PSAP.
41. LATA refers to "Local Access and Transport Area," which was the term adopted by
the court overseeing the AT&T consent decree. The LATA boundaries thus defined the
areas within which the Bell Operating Companies could deliver phone calls and where calls
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short, technological constraints and politically defined boundaries make
it difficult to create a more cohesive state-wide or regional E9-1-1
network even if different agencies were inclined to cooperate with one
another on a broader scale.
To make matters worse, even where cooperation is technically
feasible and politically viable, the existing technology limits the
effectiveness of such cooperation. In particular, current constraints based
on the use of old signaling technology and the lack of broadband
communication links between PSAPs limits the ability of call-takers to
transfer data that has already been collected from the caller along with
the call when it is transferred from one PSAP to another. By contrast,
users of modern call centers managed by businesses such as airlines
generally take for granted that information taken by one operator can be
passed along to another. In a cruel irony, it is the 9-1-1 network where
such capabilities are at a premium-and not for those airline customers,
for example-as the loss of precious seconds while the call-taker in the
other jurisdiction collects the same information a second time can be a
matter of life and death. Moreover, this limitation has other spillover
effects as it discourages cooperation that might give rise to a range of
efficiencies, such as shared foreign-language-speaking call-takers, call-
takers during slow periods, and specialized databases or software
programs.
3. Constraints Associated with In-band Multi-frequency
CAMA Signaling
For many casual users and observers of telecommunications
technology, the importance of signaling technology often goes
unappreciated. Such technology, while largely hidden from view, plays a
key role in handling all telephone calls-including emergency calls to 9-
1-1-and is sometimes referred to as the "nervous system" of
telecommunications networks. As described above, the in-band, analog
MF signaling that is used to deliver the ANI information between the
E9-1-1 Control Office and the PSAP is a particularly primitive and
outdated form of signaling. Consequently, it is slow and has limited
capacity compared to modern forms of signaling.
The limitations of MF signaling undermine the effectiveness of the
9-1-1 network in two important ways. First, its slow speed prolongs call
setup time (which can exceed 5 to 10 seconds), thereby wasting seconds
that are precious when responding to emergencies. Indeed, in extreme
cases where the call setup delay is long enough, this delay may have the
could only be handled by the so-called "long distance companies" like AT&T and MCI (who
carried "inter-LATA" calls).
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pernicious effect of leading the caller to think that the call has not gone
through rather than still being processed. In such a situation, the caller
may simply abandon the call only to try again and receive the same delay.
This not only results in the waste of precious seconds, but also
unnecessarily adds to the traffic load on a system that may already be
under stress in a disaster situation. Second, because MF signaling
information is transmitted in an analog format, i.e., as audio tones, it is
also more prone to errors than its more reliable digital signaling
counterpart.
A third limitation that results from the use of MF signaling is that
critical information associated with a call cannot be carried along with
the call itself. As explained above, wireless networks are capable of
discerning the X-Y coordinates (and potentially Z, the altitude
information that may indicate the floor of a high-rise building) of a caller
when they achieve Phase II compliance. Given the constraints of MF
signaling, however, such information cannot be carried along with and
delivered simultaneously with the call. Rather, in the current
architecture, the PSAP must request the additional information over a
separate datalink. This additional step may result in increased delay in
the delivery of information associated with the call. This delay may not
be consequential if the call-taker does not need the information
immediately, but the limitations of MF signaling constrain the ability of
the designer to choose between what information is delivered
simultaneously with the call and what information is delivered later based
upon a database query.
The limitations of MF signaling are easily remedied through an
upgrade to the more modern and widely adopted form of signaling
known as "Signaling System No. 7" ("SS7"). Unfortunately, this will not
occur so long as the E9-1-1 network continues to rely upon CAMA
signaling between the E9-1-1 Control Office and the PSAP. As a
result, the E9-1-1 network will be constrained by the performance of
those trunks and the associated equipment at the PSAP. In an insult on
top of injury, not only is the performance of the E9-1-1 network
constrained by the use MF signaling-the weakest link in the signaling
chain-but the use of that technology requires an extra device or gateway
to translate between more modern forms of signaling (e.g., SS7) and the
MF signaling which can cause additional call setup delay. Finally,
because the CAMA equipment used to support MF signaling is no
longer specified or used in the ordinary Public Switched Telephone
Network ("PSTN"), it is more difficult to maintain and there is little or
no incentive for manufacturers to improve its performance.
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4. Constraints Associated with Fixed Point-to-Point Data
Links
As explained earlier, today's E9-1-1 architecture includes a point-
to-point, non-switched data link between the equipment at the PSAP
and the ALl database. It is not unusual to find this data link operating
at extremely low speeds and over analog facilities using antiquated
modems rather than over modern high-speed, digital facilities. These
low-speed links can slow the time between when a query is initiated and
the ALI information is delivered to the call-taker. Moreover, the limited
MF signaling capacity described immediately above, coupled with the
limited connectivity and capacity of these low-speed dedicated point-to-
point data links, severely constrains the ability of call-takers/dispatchers
in a PSAP serving one area to efficiently share information with call-
takers/dispatchers in a PSAP serving another area. As we noted in our
discussion of traditional circuit-switched Selective Routers, the lack of
broadband communications links between and among PSAPs limits the
ability of call-takers to automatically transfer data that has already been
collected from the caller along with the call when it is transferred from
one PSAP to another. More generally, the lack of switched, broadband
data communications links between and among PSAPs and other public
safety and governmental agencies not only means that precious seconds
may be lost while call-takers exchange information verbally or collect it a
second time from the caller, it also reduces important performance
measures such as call processing time and reliability. Finally, because the
current architecture creates "isolated PSAP islands," it discourages
efficiencies that could be gained by sharing expensive or specialized
personnel and information resources between different PSAPs.
E. Elements and Architecture of the Next Generation 9-1-1
System
Having described the current E9-1-1 architecture and the
constraints and shortcomings associated with that architecture, we now
move to describe a Next Generation 9-1-1 ("NG9-1-1") system that
would diminish-and, in some instances, alleviate-these constraints
and limitations. In particular, we outline how an NG9-1-1 system
should follow the path of commercial enterprises by using a modern,
secure, and reliable digital, packet-switched, IP-based broadband
platform capable of receiving and processing emergency calls in
increasingly diverse and powerful ways. As we explain, such an NG9-1-
1 system would enable emergency 9-1-1 "calls" from a myriad of different
devices to connect to the system over a wide range of competitive access
networks.
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1. Introduction to Next Generation Technology and Its
Application to 9-1-1
First, it is useful to conceive of the entire E9-1-1 network as
consisting of three parts: (1) call delivery, (2) call processing, and (3)
radio dispatch. These three parts are depicted in Figure 7.
Figure 7: Elements of a NG9-1-1 System
Subscriber First Responder
Call delivery consists of picking up the emergency call at the
subscriber's terminal device and delivering the call and associated
information, including the location of the device, to an interface at the
Selective Router (or its equivalent). Call delivery is accomplished over an
access network so named because it is the portion of the broader network
used by subscribers to obtain access to voice, text, data, image, video
services, or combinations thereof. In an earlier era, the only network that
delivered calls was that operated by Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers
("ILECs"). Today, however, an array of providers deliver such calls,
including Competitive Local Exchange Carriers ("CLECs"), wireless
providers, and Voice over IP ("VoIP") providers.42 Indeed, more 9-1-1
calls are delivered today by non-ILEC subscriber access networks than by
the ILECs themselves.43
Call processing consists of picking up the call and location
information at the input interface of the Selective Router or its
equivalent, delivering the call to the correct PSAP, determining the
nature of the emergency and the needed response, and handing the call
off to the dispatcher. Call processing thus includes the Selective Router
or its equivalent, the switching and transmission facilities for delivering
the call to a call-taker, plus the supporting CPE, computers, databases,
42. Note that today, the PSAP must take a specific action--a database dip into the ALI
database--to obtain the location of the caller. In the future, we assume that all access
providers will be responsible for delivering the location information with the call.
43. See, e.g., N.H. OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE BUDGET ASSISTANT, STATE OF NEW
HAMPSHIRE ENHANCED 911 SYSTEM: PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT 2 (2006)
[hereinafter N.H. PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT], available at
http://www.gencourt.state.nh.us/lba/PDF/E911_2006.pdf ("According to a 2003 [Bureau of
Emergency Communications] report, an estimated 33,000 of 64,000 calls (52 percent) received
during a two-month period were placed from wireless phones.").
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and other information processing equipment utilized by a PSAP. In
some cases, where the call-taker and dispatcher functions are combined,
the interface between the call processing function and the dispatch
function will be in the mind of that person. By contrast, where the
functions are split, the call processing function includes the delivery of
the necessary information on the call to the proper dispatcher of the
needed First Responders, e.g., law enforcement, fire, or emergency
medical personnel.
Radio dispatch consists of receiving the information about the
emergency call and dispatching one or more First Responders and
associated assets to the scene, taking into account a host of factors such
as the location and nature of the emergency, and the location and status
of First Responders and other assets in the field.
In the remainder of this section, we focus our attention on the
second part of the overall network described, i.e., on the call processing
portion illustrated in Figure 7. Before so doing, however, we offer three
preliminary observations. First, it is important to appreciate that the
radio dispatch portion of the overall network also suffers from a number
of important constraints or limitations. Foremost among these
limitations are: (1) bandwidth constraints that limit the ability of the
dispatch function to support the delivery of broadband services (e.g.,
high-speed data, image and video) to and among First Responders and
(2) limitations on interoperability which severely limit badly needed
coordination among different first responder groups especially when
different jurisdictions or levels of government are involved (as in a mutual
aid situation).' These issues are beyond the scope of this Article, but it
is important to highlight for our purposes that a modern, secure, and
reliable digital, packet-switched, IP-based broadband platform that
supports the call processing or PSAP portion of the overall network
could also provide the fixed (e.g., fiber optic based) part of the next
generation, interoperable, broadband wireless dispatch network that is
now being developed.
Second, it is important to recognize the implications of an
environment where the call processing portion of the overall network is
supported by a modern, secure, and reliable digital, packet-switched, IP-
based broadband platform. As we will discuss in more detail below, such
a platform removes the signaling and data communications constraints
that now prevent the rapid seamless sharing of information among
PSAPs and other public safety and governmental agencies. By so doing,
44. DALE N. HATFIELD & PHILIP J. WEISER, SILICON FLATIRONS TELECOMMS.
PROGRAM, TOWARD A NExT GENERATION NETWORK FOR PUBLIC SAFETY
COMMUNICATIONS 11-13 (2007), available at http://www.silicon-
flatirons.org/documents/pubfications/policy/HatfieldWeiserPubficSafetyCommunications.pdf.
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it saves precious seconds in call processing time, increases reliability by
facilitating backup and load-sharing arrangements, 45 and encourages
efficiencies that could be gained by sharing expensive or specialized
personnel and information resources.
Third, before proceeding to explain the architecture of an IP-based
NG9-1-1 system, it merits explanation that the use of Internet
technology does not necessarily involve the use of the public Internet per
se. Consider, for example, that the Internet Protocol suite or family of
protocols is widely used by corporate America to enable "Intranet"
systems that connect branch offices, key suppliers, and valued customers.
Such a network is maintained as a secure and managed network that,
while utilizing the same protocols as the public Internet, is entirely
separate from it.
From a technical perspective, the concept of a "next generation"
architecture is taking on a standardized meaning across different
environments ranging from classic wireline telephony, to cable television,
to wireless telephony, and to emerging networks such as WiMAX
systems. Next generation networks replace analog, narrowband
technology with digital, broadband technology and use packet-switching
facilities that support all kinds of applications-voice, text, data, image,
video, and multimedia combinations thereof-on a multipurpose
network. Moreover, next generation networks almost universally use the
IP suite of standards and protocols as a means of logically organizing
their respective platforms and as a way of routing packets of
information-voice, text, data, image or video as the case may be-
between different platforms and over diverse types of transmission media,
e.g., fiber optic cable, coaxial cable, twisted pair copper cable, or radio
spectrum .
In the case of a next generation network for 9-1-1, there are three
powerful reasons why the Internet Protocol suite of protocols should
support the NG9-1-1 platform. First, since the different access networks
providing the call delivery portion of the overall network are or will be
using IP packets and the IP protocol suite to interconnect with other
45. Load sharing would be helpful in exigent circumstances where call takers are busy.
For example, a recent TV news station's investigation of Valley Emergency Communications
Center--which serves six Salt Lake, Utah-area cities and Salt Lake county-found that "the
center's internal memos and [KSL's] investigation reveal it doesn't matter if it's a busy time or
not. Calls made at 3 a.m., 11 a.m., and 8 p.m. were all put on hold with people waiting
minutes for a live person." Debbie Dujanovic, 911 Nightmare Uncovered in Investigative
Report, KSL.COM, Nov. 1, 2007, http://www.ksl.com/index.php?nid=481&sid=2077061.
46. An IP packet of information is sometimes analogized to standardized shipping
containers that can be used to convey a wide variety of content such as television sets, clothing,
household goods, and machinery on a wide variety of transportation vehicles such as
containerized ships, railroad cars, or truck trailers. The standardized container facilitates
interconnection among the different transportation modes.
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networks, it makes sense for the NG9-1-1 system do the same to be
compatible. In particular, this eliminates or reduces the amount of
processing that is necessary at the interface between the call delivery and
NG9-1-1 call processing portions of the overall network. Second, since
traditional narrowband, circuit switched technology is being rapidly
abandoned, vendors and the academic research community are focusing
their attention and financial resources on IP-based broadband digital
networks. Unless the NG9-1-1 system relies upon this same
fundamental technology, it will not be able to benefit from the improved
performance, economies of scale, and declining costs that are associated
with this seismic shift in industry direction. Third, the decentralized
control associated with certain aspects of the IP-based architecture
provides for an ability to route packets around network failures, thereby
promoting greater end-to-end reliability of the network. This open
(rather than proprietary) architecture provides great value to end users
because it diminishes the chances of "vendor lock-in."
2. The Case for a Next Generation Architecture for E9-1-1
To develop our notional description of an NG9-1-1 system, we
have relied heavily upon the work of experts in the field, including the
forward-looking work of certain vendors. Most notably, however, we
draw upon the description in the a recent publication entitled "Next
Generation 9-1-1 System Initiative: Concept of Operations" published
by the Intelligent Transportation Division of the U.S. Department of
Transportation ("DoT").47 In particular, the DoT vision calls for a next
generation 9-1-1 initiative that would: (1) "[e]nable E9-1-1 calls from
any networked communications device," (2) "[e]nable geographic-
independent call access, transfer, and backup among PSAPs and between
PSAPs and other authorized emergency organizations," (3) "[e]ncourage
a flexible, open, non-proprietary, and secure architecture to facilitate the
implementation of an interoperable internetwork" of all emergency
organizations, and (4) "[m]aximize emergency services capital,
operations, and maintenance cost savings."48
47. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., NEXT GENERATION 9-1-1 (NG9-1-1) SYSTEM
INITIATIVE: CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS (2007), available at
http://www.its.dot.gov/ng911/pdf/NG91 lConOps.AprilO7.pdf.
48. Id. at 8. In principle, an NG9-1-1 system can reduce capital, operations, and
maintenance costs over what they would otherwise be to support today's E9-1-1 functionality.
In practice, however, the future costs may actually exceed today's 9-1-1 costs because of the
need to run both the traditional system and the NG9-1-1 system during a transition phase and
because of the greatly increased functionality that is enabled by broadband, IP-based
technology. Consider, for example, that while the NG9-1-1 network may provide economies
of scale and/or scope in transporting voice, text, data, image, and video traffic, additional
software and hardware may well be needed at the PSAP to utilize new applications that take
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As explained earlier, an NG9-1-1 system can be divided into the
three components-call delivery, call processing, and radio dispatch,
which are depicted in the high-level diagram set forth in Figure 8
(below). Note that the oval shapes on the left of the Figure 8 represent
different types of call delivery or access networks ranging from wireline
telephony companies to wireless cellular/PCS companies to VoIP
providers to email or Instant Messaging systems. Notably, as for each
category, there may be multiple companies and some companies may
provide more than one service. Moreover, the rectangular dot at the left
of each access network represents the subscriber or end user device
whereas the rectangular dot at the right of the oval represents the
interface point between the call delivery network portion of the system
and the call processing network portion of the system, i.e., the equivalent
function of the Selective Router in today's E9-1-1 network.
The large vertically oriented oval represents a state-wide or region-
wide, modern, broadband, packet-switched, managed, IP-based network
of the type we described earlier. That network both routes the
emergency call and associated information (e.g., call back number or its
equivalent) to the proper PSAP and provides broadband connectivity
between and among the PSAPs shown as smaller ovals toward the right
of the figure. Moreover, it provides connectivity to associated shared
resources such as specialized databases (e.g., on the characteristics of
hazardous materials or the status of emergency medical facilities such as
hospitals in the area/region). As for the small rectangular dots between
the state-wide or region-wide network and the PSAPs, they represent
the interfaces between those networks. Finally, to the right in the figure
are ovals representing the radio dispatch networks for dispatching law
enforcement, fire, and emergency medical personnel in response to the
emergency call.
advantage of the additional capabilities. Moreover, the technological life of the elements
comprising the NG9-1-1 system may well be shorter than the equipment that is being
replaced with the result that the new elements may need to be upgraded or replaced more
frequently.
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As explained above, this Article focuses on the call processing
portion of the system-including the state-wide or region-wide
broadband network and the individual PSAPs within the state or region.
Significantly, there are two types of advances facilitated by the adoption
of an NG9-1-1 system: (1) the ability to provide a more effective service
and (2) the ability to do so more efficiently. We will enumerate the
points behind each category in turn.
In terms of providing greater levels of effectiveness, there are five
principal reasons that an NG9-1-1 network would constitute a dramatic
improvement over the traditional 9-1-1 network. First, an NG9-1-1
network would enable E9-1-1 calls to be received from virtually any end
user device served by any type of IP-based call delivery (access) network
using any available mode-voice, text, data, image, and video.4 9 Second,
this network would enable E9-1-1 calls and critical information
associated with the call to be seamlessly transferred from one PSAP to
any other PSAP connected to the state-wide or regional network. 0
49. Until the conversion of the existing PSTN to an IP-based network is complete,
gateways between the existing E9-1-1 network and the NG9-1-1 call processing network
would be required.
50. While transferring E9-1-1 calls and associated information from one PSAP to
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Third, an NG9-1-1 network would reduce call setup times, facilitate
faster overall response times, and improve the quality of service as
perceived by the end users of E9-1-1. Fourth, the use of flexible, open,
and non-proprietary standards would facilitate information exchange
between and among different emergency responder groups operating at
different levels of government by and with appropriate private sector
entities-thus facilitating interoperability between them. Fifth and
finally, by reducing the threat of "vendor lock-in" and enabling PSAPs to
benefit from technological advances transforming the
telecommunications sector more broadly, PSAPs would be able to adopt
innovations and benefit from declining costs that telecommunications
providers and their enterprise customers are currently enjoying.
5 1
In terms of efficiency, there are three principal efficiency gains that
would arise from the implementation of an NG9-1-1 system. First, as
noted above and discussed more in the next part, an NG9-1-1 system
would facilitate other cooperative arrangements between and among
PSAPs connected to the state-wide or regional network, ranging from
backup agreements (e.g., to handle call overflows during unexpectedly
heavy usage periods or in the event of a major failure at one or more
PSAP locations) to agreements to share scarce resources such as call-
takers with a particular expertise (e.g., a speaker of a language in addition
to English) and agreements to share specialized databases. Second, the
adoption of an NG9-1-1 system would enable the automatic delivery of
additional information regarding the caller (e.g., voluntarily entered
information on the caller's medical condition) or the caller's location
(e.g., information regarding onsite hazardous materials) that could be
retrieved at the option of the call-taker. Finally, an NG9-1-1
architecture would enable the E9-1-1 network to be managed in a
another in the event of a failure or overload conditions is important in the sense that it
provides greater assurance that emergency calls will be answered, it is not an end in itself.
Rather, the PSAP that ultimately receives the emergency call must be in a position to assist in
the appropriate response. If the call is in regard to an incident that has already been reported
or if it is simply someone making an inquiry regarding an incident, providing an appropriate
response in the form of information may be straight-forward. More extensive coordination
among different PSAPs and First Responders is necessary if the call requires the dispatch of
personnel and other resources. The NG9-1-1 is a necessary but not sufficient condition for
facilitating such cooperation.
51. As one observer stated in a related context:
[T]he public safety user community is two orders of magnitude smaller than the
commercial user base. As a result, R&D investments in commercial wireless
technologies dwarf those made in public safety wireless technologies. In addition,
the large size of the commercial market wireless market fosters greater levels of
competition between vendors of network infrastructure, user devices, and
applications.
Krishna Balachandran et al., Mobile Responder Communications Networks for Public Safety,
IEEE COMM. MAG., Jan. 2006, at 56.
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modular fashion, with clearer demarcations between responsibilities for
call delivery, call processing, and radio dispatch, thereby providing more
opportunities for competitive supply of the different elements of the
system.
III. TOWARD NEW GOVERNANCE MODELS FOR E9-1-1
The management of calls to 9-1-1 incontestably represents a matter
of grave local concern because local-and not federal or state-officials
are likely to be the first ones to respond in a case of emergency. It is thus
understandable that localities often resist suggestions that statewide
oversight is appropriate. As discussed in Part II, however, the
technological changes related to the Internet and broadband networks,
along with the antiquated state of most 9-1-1-related infrastructure,
creates an opportunity for local PSAPs to transition to a more advanced
technology platform. Stated differently, PSAPs can begin to share with
one another virtually and benefit from economies of scale and scope by
becoming users of NG9-1-1 technology. To make this transition,
however, localities and operators of PSAPs will need to be willing to
cooperate with one another, states will need to ensure reliable sources of
funding (see Part IV), and all relevant stakeholders will need to ensure
that the appropriate coordination takes place and the necessary
technology infrastructure is put in place.
At the outset, we need to emphasize two basic points. First, while
we do not recommend a "one size fits all" model-remote rural areas will
need to adopt different strategies than dense urban ones-we do believe
that some basic governance structures and strategies can help to manage
and expedite the transition to an NG9-1-1 system. Second, we
recognize that different states have different governmental traditions,
such as a stronger commitment to home rule, and that these traditions
must be taken into account in devising appropriate governance strategies.
In any event, rather than attempt to devise a comprehensive solution, we
emphasize strategies that we believe can work across the several states
and provide effective governance strategies that go hand-in-hand with
the funding strategy recommendations we make in Part IV.
In general, this Part discusses the relevant governance issues,
highlighting important reforms that state governments can make to spur
progress toward an NG9-1-1 system. In particular, Section A begins by
providing some basic background information and Section B outlines the
range of governance models used by the several states. Section C then
sets forth our conclusions on best practices, suggesting four lessons for
state oversight of 9-1-1 networks. Finally, Section D explains the
appropriate role for the federal government in this area.
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A. Background
PSAPs have emerged as part of local and, in some cases, state
governments' provision of fire, law enforcement, and emergency medical
services. This development, however, has not reflected any clear or
consistent logic or thoughtful strategy. In some states, for example,
PSAPs track geographic boundaries such as counties whereas other
states, such as Missouri, have some PSAPs at the county level, some at
the local level (with 23 PSAPs in one county), and yet others at the
regional level.1
2
As part of the effort to institutionalize "9-1-1" as a universal
emergency number, some state governments entered into 9-1-1 matters
by establishing state oversight bodies. Such inroads, however, were often
viewed with suspicion by local agencies, particularly when they were
already operating effectively. Thus, in many states, the real impetus for
state involvement came around the push for enhanced functionality for
wireless telephones supported by the wireless providers themselves, as
they did not want to deal with multiple jurisdictions. Unlike their
wireline predecessors, wireless telephones did not necessarily fall within
the jurisdiction of a particular PSAP. For example, a commuter with a
wireless phone may cross the jurisdictional boundaries of several PSAPs
en route to the workplace. Consequently, the effort to oversee the
upgrade of their capability and of the PSAPs' ability to process
information relayed from wireless phones lent itself more naturally to
state oversight spanning multiple PSAP jurisdictions.
As explained in Part II, the emergence of next generation
technologies related to the Internet provides new opportunities for
emergency communications. Such opportunities, which depend upon a
successful migration strategy away from the legacy infrastructure,
generally entail the use of new network architectures that can be best
provided at the state or regional level. The transition to a next
generation architecture, however, is not only a matter of upgrading the
relevant equipment. Rather, states must also develop effective
governance models to spur the adoption of technological change and to
overcome resistance to change.
As we discuss below, the traditional stance that the technology used
in wireline E9-1-1 is a matter of local control needs to yield to the
exercise of some authority and oversight by state agencies in order to spur
the necessary technological development and cooperation that will make
possible the use of an advanced communications infrastructure. 3 Some
52. L. ROBERT KIMBALL & Assoc. PSAP REPORT FOR MISSOURI, supra note 23, at
4.
53. To be sure, state public utility commissions ("PUCs"), insofar as they regulate
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of those we interviewed suggested that local officials appreciated this fact
and welcome state oversight. By contrast, others suggested that localities
would be reluctant to give up control of traditional prerogatives,
including the right to purchase whatever equipment they chose, and thus
would resist adopting new technologies. As noted at the outset,
however, we do not believe that the opportunities afforded by an NG9-
1-1 system are merely discretionary choices that should be left to local
control. Rather, the capabilities afforded by such a system are critical to
public safety and homeland security and should thus be implemented as
soon as practicable.
B. The Range of Governance Models
Unlike many areas of public policy concern, the models of
regulation to spur the adoption of 9-1-1 technology on the part of both
governments and telecommunications providers vary widely across the
several states. Indeed, the extent of the variability is so considerable that
the differences cannot be neatly categorized along one dimension. For
exposition purposes, we will distinguish between states by the level of
statewide leadership they provide concerning the provision of E9-1-1
services. That classification, however, is a crude one, as some states have
instituted centralized bodies to address issues related to calls to PSAPs
from wireless phones, but not from wireline ones. Similarly, some states
have instituted statewide leadership initiatives in theory, but have failed
to empower them in practice.
As noted above, many states have entirely separate governance
systems to support wireless E9-1-1 than wireline E9-1-1. In Alabama,
for example, the State has an E9-1-1 Coordinator, who lacks statutory or
formal authority concerning wireline E9-1-1 matters, but has a wireless
E9-1-1 Board that is charged with distributing funds to localities.
Similarly, in Indiana, there is a state wireless E9-1-1 Board with formal
authority, but no such counterpart on the wireline side, which ultimately
limits the opportunities for upgrading the entirety of the 9-1-1
infrastructure.
Putting aside the gradations in authority, we conclude that the
empowerment of a state 9-1-1 entity makes a material difference in
facilitating faster adoption of advanced 9-1-1 technology. Compare, for
example, Indiana and Ohio. In Indiana, the state established a well-
funded and empowered state wireless 9-1-1 Board with a professional
incumbent providers, do regulate the technology used in 9-1-1 services. Outside of the
antiquated model of requiring the incumbent provider to cross-subsidize the provision of 9-1-
1 services, however, the PUCs have generally played a limited role in technology adoption
decisions.
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executive director. Consequently, it has not only implemented Phase II
wireless access throughout the state, it has also developed an advanced
infrastructure and emerged as a leader in migrating toward an NG9-1-1
system. Notably, Indiana has enabled non-traditional entities like
telematics services and SMS messages (on a trial basis) to gain access to
the 9-1-1 network. Meanwhile, in Ohio, there is no statewide oversight
and the state relies on an advisory board structure that leaves each PSAP
free to act autonomously. Notably, even though Ohio collects some 9-1-
1 funding at the state level, it automatically disperses it to the local
agencies and provides no accountability for how it is spent. Not
surprisingly, Ohio has yet to complete the transition to Phase II wireless
and, except for some local efforts (like Hamilton County) has not
progressed toward an NG9-1-1 system.
The interviews we conducted with all segments of the 9-1-1 world
underscored that support for PSAPs in terms of education, funding, and
accountability make a considerable difference and that those states with
oversight bodies are able to provide those functions far more effectively
than those without oversight. These discussions echoed the findings of
important studies of the state of 9-1-1, including the Hatfield Report
commissioned by the FCC.54 Despite the strong consensus on this
point, some states-about 15 according to NENA5 5-have not
developed any central 9-1-1 coordination function and have fallen
behind those states with coordinators in terms of their level of progress
on Phase I and Phase II wireless. Notably, even some states with
coordination functions, like Colorado, have failed to truly empower their
coordinators. Underscoring the weaknesses of the Colorado model,
Susan Sherwood from Verizon noted that Colorado has lagged behind
other states when it comes to upgrading the 9-1-1 network, noting more
generally that "states without oversight bodies are not good at PSAP
education" in terms of advancing technologies.
5 6
Empowering leaders to spur technological change is an important
part of upgrading the 9-1-1 system for a new era. In New Mexico, for
example, the state took seriously the need to upgrade its 9-1-1 system
and conducted a national search for a highly qualified E9-1-1 Program
Director and hired an industry professional (Bill Range) to work in the
54. See generally HATFIELD REPORT, supra note 15; see also U.S. GOV'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, STATES' COLLECTION AND USE OF FUNDS FOR WIRELESS
ENHANCED 911 SERVICES 16 (2006) [hereinafter GAO STATES' COLLECTION REPORT],
available athttp://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06338.pdf.
55. For a discussion of central coordination functions, see MONITOR GROUP, ANALYSIS
OF THE E9-1-1 CHALLENGE 58, 77-78 (2003) [hereinafter MONITOR GROUP REPORT 1],
available athttp://www.911monitor.com/Analysis.pdf.
56. Telephone interview with Susan Sherwood, E911 Manager, Verizon Wireless (Aug.
8, 2007).
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state Department of Finance and Administration. The state also
empowered the Office of the Program Director to collect and disperse
funding, oversee equipment procurement, and provide support to local
PSAPs. As such, New Mexico has already commissioned a feasibility
study and aspires to be one of the first states to develop an NG9-1-1
system for both wireless and wireline access networks. By contrast, states
that constitute oversight bodies with representatives only from local
telephone companies or from any one particular industry segment are less
likely to be effective than those with a more representative body and
professional administration.
C Recommended Governance Reforms within State 9-1-1
Management
Policymakers have experimented with different approaches to 9-1-1
over the last thirty years and additional experimentation has occurred
over the last ten or so years with respect to wireless E9-1-1. Collectively,
these experiences yield some useful lessons. In this Article, we will focus
on four such lessons. In particular, we address the importance of: (1) a
formally authorized and statutorily codified oversight body, (2) statewide
oversight over mission critical networks, (3) an incentive strategy to spur
PSAP technological upgrades, and (4) an empowerment strategy toward
"PSAP cooperation."
1. The Importance of an Empowered Oversight Body
In California, the state relied on an informal advisory board for
years before the State Legislature codified its commitment to a more
formal structure. As Daphne Rhoe, the California 9-1-1 Program
Manager and member of the State 9-1-1 Board explained, the statutory
codification of the Board was important because it ensured that the
Board would have diverse representation. 7 Moreover, she explained, the
added formality raised the profile of the Board because its members were
appointed by the Governor, and the Board was required to comply with
the Public Meetings Act, ensuring that meetings were accessible to the
public.58
In Tennessee, the creation of a statewide board composed of,
among others, those professionals who run PSAPs and elected officials
and the hiring of a professional Executive Director provided critical focus
to that state's efforts to improve its 9-1-1 system. With this model of
57. Telephone interview with Daphne Rhoe, California 9-1-1 Emergency Commc'ns
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governance and the ability to collect as well as disperse funds, Tennessee
emerged as the third state to provide state-wide Phase II wireless service.
Similarly, in Vermont, where the Legislature passed a 1993 statute
calling for an oversight board with broad experience and a professional
director, the state rolled out the first state Internet Protocol-based system
to support 9-1-1 communications, enabling the state to provide a "virtual
PSAP service" available to all public safety agencies in the state. By
contrast, other states have failed to ensure that state 9-1-1 Boards were
composed with officials with true expertise, thereby sacrificing their
ability to provide effective leadership on matters ranging from spurring
Phase II wireless services to planning for next generation technologies.
Our findings based on those we interviewed are echoed by other
analyses. The National Emergency Number Association ("NENA"), for
example, highlighted the significance of an empowered state oversight
body in an important 2003 study conducted by the Monitor Group. 9
Moreover, recognizing that the establishment of such a body along with
an implementation plan for upgrading E9-1-1 were commendable
practices, Congress required both as a condition of receiving funding
under the ENHANCE 9-1-1 Act, which we discuss below.6"
In advocating for an empowered oversight body, it is important to
note that such a body need not exist at the state level. Rather, for larger
and more populous states like Texas, such bodies can be created at the
regional or district level. In Texas, however, this approach has left the
relevant state entity, which oversees and works with more rural areas, less
able to support those 9-1-1 agencies not supported by a district. Our
interviews reported that districts in Texas were able to all achieve Phase
II wireless compliance effectively, whereas the rural areas outside of the
districts have yet to do so-highlighting that a lack of statewide
oversight can allow some areas to thrive at the same time that others
continue to use antiquated technology.
2. Statewide Oversight over Mission Critical Networks
Historically, 9-1-1 networks were provided as part of a "regulatory
compact" between the telephone company (mostly the pre-divestiture
Bell System) and the public. Unfortunately, the commitment to invest in
mission critical networks and spur innovation in such networks was and
still is rarely a top priority for the telephone company. Thus, as noted in
Part II, much of the current 9-1-1 infrastructure relies on out-of-date
59. Id.; see also MONITOR GROUP, ACCELERATING DEPLOYMENT OF NATIONWIDE
E9-1-1: SUMMARY FINDINGS OF THE NENA SWAT E9-1-1 STAKEHOLDERS'
INITIATIVE (2003), available athttp://www.91 1monitor.com/Summary.pdf.
60. See 47 U.S.C. § 942(b)(3) (2006).
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equipment that is difficult to replace and lacks advanced functionality.
To remedy this failing, we recommend that a state oversight body should
spur the development of an advanced system and continue to oversee its
use.
The mandate for state bodies to oversee the operation of a 9-1-1
system would represent a marked departure from the status quo. In
many states today, such as California, the relevant state body lacks
control to oversee and address network failures. This means that where a
crucial 9-1-1 connection goes down, or a service level agreement is not
adhered to, the state body cannot sanction the provider. To be sure, it is
possible that oversight over such networks can be managed by the Public
Utilities Commission ("PUC"). In such cases, however, it is still
important that the state 9-1-1 coordinator be involved in that process.
As discussed in Part II, the reliability and functionality of the 9-1-1
system is not only a matter of the state of the network but also the
equipment (i.e., the "CPE") used by the PSAPs. After all, as a
thoughtful report found in a study of Missouri's PSAPs, "[m]ost PSAPs
use equipment that cannot be upgraded to accommodate modern public
safety communications needs."6 To address this concern and ensure that
PSAPs adopt and use reliable equipment, many states have also called for
the 9-1-1 Coordinator to oversee and approve purchasing decisions.
In practice, a statewide oversight regime focused on equipment
usage can operate most effectively when the coordinator or oversight
body possesses some control over funding. As one state official put it,
"he who has the money makes the rules." Some state program offices,
however, lack either control over funding or approval authority over
equipment, preventing them from either assuring the effectiveness of the
relevant equipment or facilitating bulk purchasing opportunities. The
benefits of statewide oversight are not merely in bulk purchasing; the use
of uniform standards in a state facilitates better training opportunities,
increased support for the technology, and a higher level of
interoperability. In many states, however, use of disparate technologies is
the rule. In Missouri, for example, one study found "at least 15 different
ALI formats being used."62 In short, state oversight should ensure
adherence to a standardized architecture that facilitates greater levels of
functionality (i.e., the ability to take advantage of ongoing innovations),
as well as enables PSAPs to procure equipment and software at lower
costs (i.e., because of the ability to benefit from economies of scale and
competition).
61. L. ROBERT KIMBALL & Assoc. PSAP REPORT FOR MISSOURI, supra note 23, at
62. Id. at 19.
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Finally, the effectiveness of the 9-1-1 network also relies on well-
trained operators and users of critical equipment. To ensure that local
PSAPs receive appropriate training and operators are qualified to use-
and are comfortable with-advanced equipment, state oversight bodies
should maintain some form of a certification and re-certification
program. In Pennsylvania, for example, the State 9-1-1 Coordinator
requires the re-certification of dispatchers every three years. In short, we
believe that such practices are important and that states should develop
operational standards, provide training support so that they can be easily
met, and build in some form of oversight to ensure that they are being
met.
3. An Incentive Strategy for PSAP Technology Upgrades
Even in states with a centralized body to oversee aspects of the 9-1-
1 system, the respective bodies face considerable challenges with certain
PSAPs that, for one reason or another, have failed to invest in
technological upgrades. In the case of enabling Phase II wireless
capabilities, a number of states have overcome those challenges, but even
a number of these states, like Indiana, acknowledge that some PSAPs
have maintained antiquated analog equipment. Notably, such equipment
either requires the use of converters to translate digital communications
to analog or prevents the use of advanced technologies, such as those
necessary to enable 9-1-1 access by non-traditional entities like
telematics providers and SMS messages. To address the continuing
failure of certain PSAPs to upgrade their equipment, we recommend that
both education campaigns at the state level and dedicated sources of state
funding be provided to fund at least a portion of the necessary upgrade.
To be sure, like any sound fiscal strategy, such funding must be coupled
with effective oversight to ensure that the funds are spent appropriately.
The starting point for encouraging PSAPs to upgrade their
infrastructure is for state bodies to educate PSAPs about new
technological opportunities. As Susan Sherwood of Verizon put it, "a
lack of understanding leads to hostility."63 As detailed in the Hatfield
Report, some PSAPs remained in the dark about what equipment and
software upgrades were necessary to be able to receive wireless E9-1-1
information.64 We acknowledge, however, that education alone may not
be sufficient to spur PSAPs to embrace technological progress. After all,
changing the hearts and minds of PSAPs about the opportunities created
by new technologies may not be easy when, at a minimum, significant
job re-training will be required and, in some cases, old jobs will no longer
63. Telephone interview with Susan Sherwood, supra note 56.
64. HATFIELD REPORT, supra note 15, at 30.
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be necessary.6"
To appreciate the cultural changes associated with migrating to a
new technological environment, consider the reactions of a few seasoned
government professionals. To underscore the gravity of the challenge to
overcome the legacy mindset and the attachment to the old ways of
doing things, Indiana's Ken Lowden explained that:
Existing deficiencies (inter-agency [data] transfer, for example) have
existed for so long that they become the "given" environment. A new
network, even though it would address these long-standing
deficiencies, is not accepted by [many] PSAPs because 3-4
"generations" of PSAP staff have made the best of a technologically
antiquated network. In their minds, 9-1-1 modernization is
considered "high risk," and change is to be avoided at all costs to
avoid any risk.66
Similarly, in the related context of public safety communications, one
report observed that:
[T]he history of fiefdoms within the respective agencies obscures the
"gains from cooperation." In many cases, managers of legacy radio
systems tell chiefs that "you need to stick with the traditional land
mobile radio system" or the system won't remain secure. To be sure,
education and demonstration projects are part of the answer because
there is a basic lack of understanding about how modern networks are
designed and managed-for example, security stems from effective
encryption, not physically separate networks. Yet education alone
will not do the trick. As Chief Werner recounted from his
experience, getting beyond the silo-based approach is starting to
happen where incentives for cooperation--in the form of federal
grants-create opportunities to bring together groups of distinct
agencies and individuals through consensus-building leadership.
67
65. Explaining a similar dynamic in a different context, one observer suggested that:
More than that, however, it's clear the changes required won't be a consensus
cakewalk. Jobs will change. Careers will change. Status and relationships will
change. Some people will see themselves as worse off, perhaps dangerously worse
off, even completely without a role in the new order. In such situations, people are
rightfully anxious. As e-government moves to the future, reform becomes a game of
musical chairs. When the music stops, people must find new chairs, and some
won't be able to do so.
Jerry Mechling, A Sobering Challenge, GOVT TECH., Sept. 2, 2005, available at
http://www.govtech.com/gt/print-article.php?id=96524.
66. Telephone interview of Ken Lowden, Executive Dir., Ind. Enhanced Wirless 911
Bd., in Indianapolis, Ind. (Aug. 2, 2007).
67. Philip J. Weiser, The Aspen Institute, Clearing the Air: Convergence and the Safety
Enterprise 24-25 (2006), available at http://www.aspeninstitute.org/atf/cf/%7BDEB6F227-
2008]
J ON TELECOMM & HIGH TECH L.
Similarly, as Garry Briese put it, "[t]he hardest part of improving
emergency warning and recovery efforts is changing human behavior. "68
It is important that the use of the financial incentives and
demonstration projects by state bodies be coupled with an effective and
transparent oversight mechanism. Such mechanisms can vary from
audits to reporting requirements designed to ensure that local PSAPs
develop and implement viable strategies to adopt advanced technology.
Moreover, such mechanisms should ensure that public funds given to
local agencies are spent appropriately and that they are using appropriate
policies, training, and procurement decisions to implement advanced
technologies.
At present, some states, such as Michigan, are already using
oversight mechanisms like requiring jurisdictions operating a PSAP to
file a 9-1-1 plan with the state. In the case of Michigan, this
requirement not only mandates reporting on technological progress, but
also on the status of cooperative efforts to ensure that data exchanges
shared between jurisdictions are managed in an effective fashion.
Articulating requirements are not only a valuable means of enabling
oversight (as to matters including cooperation and technology adoption),
but they also enable localities to compare their approaches with one
another and pressure them not to fall behind their counterparts. In
particular, the use of systematic benchmarking as to the relative progress
of different PSAPs is likely to be a powerful motivator and means of
holding those lagging behind accountable. After all, when areas that fail
to adopt technical upgrades leave affected citizens in the dark about what
they are missing, that failure may well go unremedied; as Justice Brandeis
famously put it, "sunlight is the best disinfectant."69
A core challenge of state oversight and guidance efforts is to
overcome the resistance to technological change. Traditionally, local
PSAPs have not thought of themselves as smart users of dynamic
technology and thus the migration from the legacy model to a next
generation one will require a change in the prevailing cultural mindset.
To facilitate such a change, the relevant state agency needs to
demonstrate the virtues of an NG9-1-1 system, provide important
logistical support, and evangelize about the benefits of the new
technology. Moreover, state agencies also need to provide financial
659B-4EC8-8F84- 8DF23CA704F5%7D/C&.S%20FINALAIRSREP06.PDF (quoting
Charlottesville Fire Chief Charles Werner).
68. SPACE & ADVANCED COMMC'Ns RESEARCH INST., GEORGE WASHINGTON
UNIV., WHITE PAPER ON EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS 2 (2006), available at
http://satjournal.tcom.ohiou.edu/issuelO/PDF/Final VersionWhitePaper.pdf.
69. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE
IT 92 (Melvin I. Urofsky ed., Bedford/St. Martin's 1995) (1913).
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incentives for local PSAPs to migrate to an NG9-1-1 system. Such
incentives must be managed carefully, however, as some past grant
programs geared to spur adoption of new technology and change
traditional approaches have been criticized as ineffectual. 70
4. An Empowerment Strategy toward PSAP Cooperation
In almost all states we investigated, the concept of "PSAP
Consolidation" is viewed as a dirty phrase. In general, the resistance to
mandatory consolidation reflects concerns not only about the possible
loss of jobs, but even more fundamentally about the loss of control. For
local law enforcement and fire departments, for example, the ability to
manage their own call-taking operations is considered a vital component
in their emergency response operation. By contrast, the thought of out-
sourcing that function can thus be seen as challenging their ability to
perform their public mission effectively. At the same time, however,
there is considerable evidence that localities are willing to enter into
voluntary agreements to collaborate and share resources.
71
As discussed in Part II, the use of a modern IP-based NG9-1-1
system can present PSAPs with new opportunities premised on sharing
economies of scale and scope. To appreciate this point, consider three
real-world weaknesses that many PSAPs routinely face today. First,
consider PSAP reliability. With a modern IP-based NG9-1-1
architecture, PSAPs can easily route calls to back-up providers or re-
route them if they were sent to them in error. Today, however, most
PSAPs employ very crude forms of call transfer that make re-routing
difficult and may even not allow for redundant connections. Second, for
a PSAP that does not have an operator on duty at all times, a next
70. On the issue of federal grants to spur public safety interoperability, for example, the
United States Government Accountability Office concluded that, despite over $2 billion
awarded in grants from 2003 to 2005, "strategic planning has generally not been used to guide
investments and provide assistance to improve communications interoperability on a broader
level." U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FIRST RESPONDERS: MUCH WORK
REMAINS TO IMPROVE COMMUNICATIONS INTEROPERABILITY 3 (2007), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07301.pdf. As to its finding with regard to specific states, it
is found that in Kentucky where the "grant reviewers at the state level who are in charge of
disbursing DHS grant money to localities have had limited means for determining whether
funding requests for equipment and training were compatible with statewide interoperability
goals." Id. at 21.
71. A recent New Jersey study concluded, for example, that "about half of the state's
municipalities had entered into regional relationships to carry out 9-1-1 services." JOHN J.
HELDRICH CENTER FOR WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT, NJ. OFFICE OF EMERGENCY
TELECOMMS. SERVS., NEW JERSEY 9-1-1 CONSOLIDATION STUDY: PROFILE OF THE
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generation architecture promises the opportunity to maintain service at
all times. And third, consider the PSAP that relies on a single operator
who does not speak Spanish. Today, that operator is sometimes left
without any resources in the event a Spanish speaker calls for help. In an
NG9-1-1 environment, by contrast, that PSAP could easily conference
in another PSAP operator with Spanish speaking abilities. To be sure,
the ability to forward calls exists in today's environment as well, but the
technology is relatively primitive, is not always available, and, most
significantly, the ability to facilitate cooperation is greatly enhanced in an
IP-based environment.
In highlighting the powerful capabilities that collaboration and
cooperation can provide, we champion the empowerment of PSAPs
through a collaboration strategy, not a consolidation one. As explained
in Part II, however, this strategy relies on the adoption of advanced
technology by PSAPs and the use of mission critical applications that can
tie together all relevant stakeholders as part of a "systems architecture."
Where such systems are put into place, the reviews are very favorable. As
Bill Buchholtz, the Executive Director of the Bexar-Metro 9-1-1
Network District in San Antonio, Texas, explained, "while talk of
consolidation sparks turf wars, talk of cooperation through networking
different PSAPs-and even operators from home-inspires interest and
support."72 In Vermont, the state has taken this level of interest to the
next level, tying together all ten PSAPs into a virtual system so that they
can support and provide back-up services for one another.
We recognize that even the empowerment strategy we advocate
here is likely to meet some resistance. After all, many PSAPs are content
with their current call processing model and may lack the funding to
migrate to a new technological architecture or may simply lack
sophistication in modern information and communications technology
and resist change on that ground. Recognizing such resistance and
funding challenges, we suggest that statewide funding for a next
generation systems architecture be managed at the state level and coupled
with state logistical support for this transition. To be sure, local or
regional PSAPs can-and some do-develop cooperative agreements on
their own, but our conclusion is that a statewide commitment to forging
such cooperation will result in a greater level of overall cooperation and
collaboration. After all, there is no reason why individual PSAPs should
own and operate individual "back office systems" when such systems can
be much more affordably shared among a number of them.
In developing models for cooperation between PSAPs, it is critical
72. Telephone interview with Bill Buchholtz, Executive Dir., Bexar-Metro 9-1-1
Network Dist., in San Antonio, Tex. (June 29, 2007).
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that the collaboration be structured through a well-understood model of
governance. In particular, if one PSAP is taking the lead on managing
the shared resource, or if a state entity is doing so, it is essential that the
parties agree up-front on the relevant terms of cooperation. After all,
"[e]xperiences in public sector cross-boundary collaboration demonstrate
that a sound governance structure is critical to success and should not be
left to chance."73 Notably, such structures will be easier to implement if
they take place within the context of a state framework that calls for
standardization of equipment and operating procedures, such as how
operators are trained. We recognize that, even under the best of
scenarios, implementing structures to facilitate cooperation will not take
place without some challenges. Such challenges, however, are worth
confronting to improve the quality and reliability of the 9-1-1 network as
well as to save money through more effective sharing of resources.
D. The Role for the Federal Government
As suggested above, state and local governments are principally
responsible for providing access to 9-1-1 from all communications
technologies. To date, the federal government has sought to promote
progress in access to 9-1-1 by focusing largely on only one-half of the
equation-the carriers themselves. This focus has resulted largely from
the fact that the FCC in particular and the federal government more
generally has lacked jurisdiction over PSAPs. Nonetheless, this strategy
is an unfortunate one, as discussed in Part II, because it mandates that
next generation services interface with antiquated technologies used in
the 9-1-1 network. Such jury-rigging often comes at considerable
expense and, moreover, fails to enhance the ability of the PSAPs to
receive valuable information such as data, text, images, and video
services. Consequently, the federal government must also focus on the
other half of the equation as well, i.e., the technological capabilities of
the PSAPs and play a constructive role in supporting the development
73. NAT'L ASS'N OF STATE CHIEF INFO. OFFICERS, GETING STARTED IN CROSS-
BOUNDARY COLLABORATION: WHAT STATE CIOS NEED TO KNOW 4 (2007), available at
http://www.nascio.org/publications/documents/NASCIO-CrossBoundaryCollaboration.pdf.
As that report detailed:
A dear and representative governance model reflecting the diverse leadership among
the entities that are collaborating is one of the most important first steps. Even the
best intentions can fail if each organization involved is unclear which entity is
spearheading the project, or if each organization thinks that it is the leading body.
Developing a charter at the outset of collaboration can be a beneficial way to
establish rules of engagement. Involving stakeholders at the very beginning of the
project, and keeping them informed throughout the life of the collaboration, can
prove to be an important asset in maintaining momentum and progress.
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and adoption of new technologies.
Over the last several years, the federal government has begun to
acknowledge the importance of supporting the development of a more
technologically advanced E9-1-1 system. In 2004, Congress enacted the
"Ensuring Needed Help Arrives Near Callers Employing 9-1-1"
("ENHANCE") Act, which established an "E-9-1-1 Implementation
Coordination Office" and authorized $250 million per year for five years
in matching grants to enhance emergency communications services.
74
Despite recognizing the value of a federal leadership role, Congress has
thus far failed to appropriate these funds. Recently, however, some
recent legislative efforts have sought to address this failing (at least in
part) and others (notably, the H.R. 3403, 9-1-1 Modernization and
Public Safety Act of 2007)7 5 have sought to provide additional federal
leadership on the transition to a next generation network for emergency
communications. On the whole, however, the federal government has
yet to commit to supporting the transition to an NG9-1-1 architecture
and has enacted legislation that fails "to effectively further federal
legislative purpose and policies."76
In short, we recommend that the federal government play a
constructive role in supporting the technological progress towards an
NG9-1-1 system as part of a "cooperative federalism" strategy.77 First,
the federal government should work, as the Department of
Transportation ("DoT") already is doing, in developing the basic
architecture that outlines how an NG9-1-1 system would operate and
why it is vastly superior to the legacy system. Going forward, however,
"achieving consensus on the finer details of the architecture will be
challenging and complex."78 To aid the federal government in this effort,
the DoT has selected a number of subcontractors to develop a national
architecture and transition plan, including Texas A&NI University,
where different solutions are being tested and trialed in an Internet
Protocol-based environment. Ideally, the federal government can both
demonstrate to the states the advantages of such advanced technologies
74. ENHANCE 911 Act of 2004 § 104, 47 U.S.C. § 942.
75. 9-1-1 Modernization and Public Safety Act of 2007, H.R. 3403, 110th Cong.
(2007), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=h110-3403.
76. James E. Holloway et al., Regulation and Public Pohcyin the Full Deployment of the
Enhanced Emergency Call System (E911) and Their Influence on Wireless Cellular and
Other Technologies, 12 B.U. J. SCI. &TECH. L. 93, 125 (2006).
77. For a discussion of how cooperative federalism programs work, see Philip J. Weiser,
Federal Common Law, Cooperative Federalism, and the Enforcement ofthe Telecom Act, 76
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1692 (2001).
78. LINDA D. DODGE, NEXT GENERATION 9-1-1 INITIATIVE, ADDRESSING THE
OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES OF TOMORROW AT THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
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as well as provide a roadmap that can facilitate their adoption.
Second, the federal government should play an active role, through
agencies like the National Institute for Standards and Technology
("NIST"), the National Telecommunications and Information Agency
("NTIA"), the Department of Homeland Security, the DoT, and the
FCC to support the development of the basic standards that will enable a
next generation network for emergency communications to operate
effectively. It is important that the specialized applications for
emergency communications be developed. To do so, however, will
require national leadership in terms of both vision and support for
research and development. At present, there are some notable private
sector efforts, including (1) an ATIS/ESIF initiative to develop
standards (along with NENA) for the interconnection of all types of
networks and with the emergency 9-1-1 networks79 and (2) the Internet
Engineering Task Force ("IETF")'s focus on the use of 9-1-1 in
connection with Internet-based communications. 80  Going forward,
however, it will be imperative for the federal government to play a
supportive role, just as they are doing in the related context of supporting
the advancement of communications technologies used in public safety
communications.
Finally, the federal government-through its 9-1-1 Implementation
Coordination Office-should fund the grant program codified by the
ENHANCE 9-1-1 Act. In taking such a step, the federal government
should develop a program that benchmarks the progress of the several
states and provides matching funding conditioned on, among other
things, effective governance mechanisms as well as sound funding
strategies, such as not engaging in raiding of E9-1-1 funds. In short,
even though the states and localities will be the primary vehicle for
funding the transition to next generation networks, it is clear to us that a
strategic federal effort in this area would be enormously valuable in
catalyzing and reinforcing such efforts.
IV. THE NEED FOR A NEW FUNDING STRATEGY
The first step in developing a new funding strategy for 9-1-1 is for
79. ATIS "is a United States based body that is committed to rapidly developing and
promoting technical and operations standards for the communications" industry. ATIS Home
Page, http://www.atis.org (last visited May 11, 2008). The Emergency Services
Interconnection Forum ("ESIF") works on standards related to emergency services. See ATIS,
Emergency Services Interconnection Forum, http://www.atis.org/esif/index.asp (last visited
May 11, 2008).
80. Comments of Cisco Sys., Inc., to the First Report & Order & Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking in E911 Requirements for IP-Enabled Serv. Providers, WC Dkt. No. 04-36,
WC Dkt. No. 05-196, 6-7 (Aug. 15, 2006), available at
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native-or-pdf=pdf&id-document=651 8142878.
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policymakers to recognize that the provision of effective access to
emergency services is a "public good" that benefits all citizens, whether or
not an individual will ever call 9-1-1. 81 After all, if someone is the victim
of a crime, has a house burning down, or is in a car accident, another
individual's call to 9-1-1-whether from a cell phone in a car, a VolP
connection at home, or a text message-could make an enormous
difference in limiting the damage to person or property. With this
perspective in mind, this Part outlines the state of 9-1-1 funding.
Section A explains the more vital social function that the 9-1-1
system performs today as compared to past decades. In particular,
despite the current nature of 9-1-1 as a public good, legacy approaches to
funding continue to prevail. Moreover, another vestige of 9-1-i's past
involves a lack of competition. Finally, Section A discusses why NG9-1-
1 systems would address this failing by facilitating innovations ushered in
by a more competitive telecommunications landscape.
Section B aims to help legislators, regulators, and other relevant
policymakers understand the big picture of 9-1-1 funding procedures,
models, and trends. By providing a comprehensible overview, we hope
to lower the barriers to the sound development of 9-1-1 policy. Notably,
existing 9-1-1 funding policies are "complicated by the lack of
understanding on how funding is collected and dispersed"82 and, as a
result, complexity is itself a barrier to sound and principled policymaking.
To address this problem, we diagram the prevailing methodology by
which 9-1-1 funds are collected, remitted, allocated, and ultimately used.
To be sure, our goal of making 9-1-1 funding comprehensible entails
trade-offs; foregrounding some aspects necessarily requires back
grounding other details. Nonetheless, we believe that an accessible
81. As one report stated, today's 9-1-1 usage "meets the non-rivalry and non-
excludability tests, frequently used to define public goods, and it is used in many circumstances
to report incidents that relate to the safety of the public as opposed to the caller." MONITOR
GROUP REPORT 1, supra note 55, at 11. Indeed, the Monitor Group Report found that "in
more than 60 percent of all 9-1-1 call situations, the caller is not involved in the emergency
being reported." Id. at 68. A public good is defined as:
a very special class of goods which cannot practically be withheld from one
individual consumer without withholding them from all (the 'nonexcludability
criterion') and for which the marginal cost of an additional person consuming them,
once they have been produced, is zero (the 'nonrivalrous consumption' criterion).
The classic example of a nearly pure public good is national defense: you cannot
defend the vulnerable border regions of a country from the ravages of foreign
invaders without also simultaneously defending everyone else who lives within the
borders.
Auburn University, Dr. Paul M. Johnson, Public Goods: A Glossary of Political Economy
Terms, http://www.auburn.edu/-johnspm/gloss/public-goods (last visited May 11, 2008).
82. NGA CENTER FOR BEST PRACTICES, ISSUE BRIEF: STATE STRATEGIES FOR
ACCELERATING ENHANCED 9-1-1 IMPLEMENTATION 4 (2004) [hereinafter NGA ISSUE
BRIEF], http://www.nga.org/cda/files/0404E911.pdf.
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discussion of 9-1-1 funding is worthwhile.
Section C, building off our findings and research, distills a series of
five normative recommendations that federal, state, and local
policymakers should consider in charting 9-1-1 policy going forward.
We emphasize that, in addition to funding amounts for 9-1-1,
policymakers must pay close attention to broader issues related to
funding, including procedures for the collection of funds, allocation and
usage of funds, and auditing and monitoring of all parties involved in the
9-1-1 system. Moreover, Section C discusses the issue of how to
evaluate the sufficiency of existing 9-1-1 funding level, recommending as
a critical prerequisite the development of a statement of requirements
that can enable policymakers to discern whether existing funding levels
and mechanisms are sufficient to support the development and migration
to such a system. In so doing, it highlights that policymakers should
focus both on preserving existing 9-1-1 systems and in developing new
funding models to facilitate the transition to NG9-1-1 systems
(including strategies for financing capital expenditures).
A. The Importance of Understanding That 9-1-1 Is a Publc
Good and Innovation Should Be Promoted
As a practical matter, the United States has not always viewed an
effective and ubiquitous emergency network as a core social value.
Notably, the United States adopted 9-1-1 approximately 30 years after
England implemented a similar 9-9-9 system. 3  Even when
implemented in the late 1960s, when it was clear that 9-1-1 capability
would be offered by the Bell System Companies, the emergency calling
system was "not mandatory" and would only be "implemented where the
emergency agencies in a community are willing to cooperate with each
other."84 Thus, by 1987, only 50% of the United States population had
access to 9-1-1." 5 The relatively slow pace of adoption reflects the fact
that 9-1-1 wireline-based funding models largely developed during a
time when 9-1-1 service was local, optional, and primarily benefited
residential phone owners who were served by a regulated monopoly local
exchange carrier.8 6  Not surprisingly, legacy funding mechanisms
83. Letter from Lee Loevinger, supra note 1.
84. Id
85. Positron Public Safety Systems, Powerpoint on Behalf of Qwest, at 1,
http://www.911dispatch.com/911/ng911 qwest.pdf (last visited May 11, 2008).
86. Another forward-looking report sounds a similar note: "The current funding model
for 9-1-1 service has its foundation in the historic regulated wireline telecommunications
environment of the past 30 years." NAT'L EMERGENCY NO. ASS'N, FUNDING 9-1-1 INTO
THE NEXT GENERATION: AN OVERVIEW OF NG9-1-1 FUNDING MODEL OPTIONS FOR
CONSIDERATION 3 (2007) [hereinafter NENA NG9-1-1 FUNDING REPORT],
http://www.nena.org/media/files/NGFundingReport.pdf.
2008]
J ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L.
reflected these characteristics. With the rise in wireless telephony,
policymakers turned to new funding models developed in the late 1990s
and early 2000s to help achieve Phase I and II compliance goals.
Even today, contemporary funding models often reflect the legacy
tradition of the telephone monopoly past: fragmented and local-centric
approaches that remain heavily dependent on inputs such as user
surcharges or costs borne by service providers. Meanwhile, the number
of players involved in the 9-1-1 system has ballooned in the wake of local
competition introduced by the 1996 Act and an expanding range of
communications services. For example, competition in the local
exchange telephony market introduced Competitive Local Exchange
Carriers ("CLECs") to 9-1-1 funding obligations. And the proliferation
of innovative telecommunications technologies and services-mobile
phones, VoIP devices, pre-paid wireless phones, etc.-added several
more types of service providers into many jurisdictions' 9-1-1 funding
schemes. Finally, while 9-1-1 remains closely tied to local government
services, its larger public safety and homeland security impacts have
accelerated state and federal government interest in 9-1-1.
With the increased use of 9-1-1 services and its now-central role in
promoting public safety, most citizens expect calls to 9-1-1 to operate
effectively and to be able to take advantage of modern technologies. One
industry source colorfully referred to heightened consumer expectations
of technology as "the CSJ effect"87 and confirmed that proprietary
industry surveys have reached the same conclusion.8 As another report
put it, "the perception of 9-1-1 service by the public has changed from an
optional service to an expected public good."89  Significantly,
approximately 99% of the population and 96% of the geographic United
States now have access to at least basic 9-1-1 services. 90 In short, the
value of 9-1-i's contributions to society is qualitatively different today
87. CSI--short for Crime Scene Investigation--is a popular television show in which
crimes are regularly solved by use of technology resources and forensic science. The show's
popularity has generally raised public expectations of technology capabilities. See, e.g., 7The
CSIE6"t Does The TV Crime Drama Influence How Jurors Think?, CBS NEWS, Mar. 21,
2005, available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/03/21/earlyshow/main681949.shtml.
88. Survey data shared by the industry source empirically underscores the chasm between
public expectations and 9-1-1 capabilities. A Spring 2007 survey of 2,580 individuals in the
United States found that almost 40% of individuals under 35 years old believe that they "can
use a text message from a cell phone to summon 9-1-1" and, additionally, over 30% of the
same group believes that they "can send a cell phone picture to 9-1-1." INTRADO INC.,
CONSUMER 9-1-1 RESEARCH (2007) (on file with author).
89. VOIP OPERATIONS FUNDING WORK GROUP OF THE VOIP OPERATIONS
COMM., NAT'L EMERGENCY No. ASS'N, NENA VOIP FUNDING AND REGULATORY
ISSUES OPERATIONAL INFORMATION DOCUMENT 5 (2006) [hereinafter NENA VOIP
OlD REPORT], available at
http://www.nena.org/media/files/VoIPNENAFundingRegulatoryOIDfinaO60606.pd
90. E9-1-1 Institute, The Issues, supra note 2.
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than during the period when traditional 9-1-1 funding models developed
and, accordingly, the elevated societal value of 9-1-1 cannot be ignored.
The levels of 9-1-1 funding, the mechanisms for fund collection,
and the usage of the relevant funds fail to reflect the modern reality that
9-1-1 is more valuable and critical now than it was at earlier stages of the
system's development. In particular, the qualitatively different value of
the 9-1-1 system today than when it was developed provides urgency for
federal, state, and local policymakers to evaluate whether their existing 9-
1-1 funding strategy will accomplish two fundamental objectives: (1)
meeting the needs of citizens who expect uniform and reliable 9-1-1
service across jurisdictional boundaries, across communication devices,
and across different communication services; and (2) promoting public
safety and homeland security by closing the chasm between E9-1-1
public safety capabilities (often limited to analog voice) and the
capabilities of commercial communications systems (often IP-based
systems that are capable of carrying voice, data, text, image, and video
services).
To ensure that it meets its objectives, we recommend a strategy for
9-1-1 that would harness the competitive forces that drive innovation in
other sectors of telecommunications. Despite widespread industry
deregulation favoring competition over the last 25 years-first, around
the break up of AT&T and, second, arising out of the 1996 Telecom
Act-significant portions of today's 9-1-1 system remain a de facto
monopoly in most jurisdictions. In particular, as one company's white
paper laments: "[R]egulation of 9-1-1 networks and related services
remains firmly rooted in a regionalized monopoly model in which 9-1-1
call routing, switching, transport, and database management services
have been the exclusive domain of the incumbent local exchange carrier
(ILEC)."91
To be sure, the historic success of the 9-1-1 system is to be
applauded and the CAMA technology leveraged by the Bell System and
subsequent incumbent providers once served the country well. It is clear,
however, that the ongoing monopoly-era style regulation of incumbent
9-1-1 service providers should be reevaluated. To that end, state
officials, carriers, and would-be competitive providers commonly pointed
to a lack of innovation incentive on the part of 9-1-1 service providers.
Consequently, even though some vendors and would-be competitive 9-
1-1 service providers are eager to move to an NG9-1-1 system,
incumbent 9-1-1 service providers ("9-1-1 SPs") are unlikely to
champion an upgrade absent regulatory change.
91. INTRADO COMMC'NS, INC., 9-1-1 NETWORKS IN THE 21ST CENTURY: THE
CASE FOR COMPETITION 2 (2007).
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In order to understand the opportunity for reforming the 9-1-1
system, policymakers must examine the current incentives of incumbent
9-1-1 SPs. Overall, incumbents often view 9-1-1 services not as a profit
center, but as a social obligation with minimal room for profits. Indeed,
one carrier insider observed that 9-1-1 services-originally provided as
part of a monopoly's regulatory compact-are not a market that many
incumbent 9-1-1 SPs would actively seek today. Significantly, an
incumbent 9-1-1 SP typically provides services at tariffed prices which
are approved by regulators at amounts that permit the recovery of their
costs plus a rate of return. To help establish lower rates, regulators often
require long amortization periods for incumbent 9-1-1 SPs' facilities. 92
This creates strong incentive to continue to collect on existing if aging
network elements, i.e., to capture past costs and collect ongoing profits,
resulting in a limited incentive to innovate.
In some instances, incumbent 9-1-1 SPs' failure to upgrade
effectively blocks innovation and serves as a bottleneck that traps
architectural improvements to the system. In particular, at least two
forms of bundled offerings from 9-1-1 SPs frustrate competition and
stifle innovation. From the PSAP's perspective, a state official noted
that incumbent 9-1-1 SPs' network and equipment are frequently offered
to PSAPs as a bundled package, and the network provider then uses its
position to prevent deployment of other networks. From the perspective
of other carriers and potential competitors, a 9-1-1 SP often bundles its
offerings into a single package, forcing would-be competitors to purchase
duplicative and rival services in order to receive necessary access to a
PSAP.
Significantly, the migration to an NG9-1-1 system promises a path
to reforming the legacy monopoly model. To highlight the nature of
that change, we return to Figure 7's tripartite representation of the 9-1-1
system (reproduced below).
Figure 7: Elements of a NG9-1-1 System
Call Delivery Call Radio
(ces) Processing Dispatch
Subscriber First Responder
In today's system, the selective router is located within the first
92. Id. at 7.
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portion (Call Delivery) of the above sequence such that an incumbent 9-
1-1 SP typically possesses a powerful bottleneck that requires
interconnection and interoperability by would-be competitive 9-1-1 SPs.
In the NG9-1-1 system, however, the selective router functionalit9 3 can
be placed directly where a call is handed off from the access network to
the call processing network. By placing the selective router functionality
at the outset of the call processing portion of the system, there is
opportunity to help relieve the traditional incumbent bottleneck and
introduce greater competition into the system. More generally, an NG9-
1-1 architecture should enable the 9-1-1 network to be managed in a
more modular fashion, with clearer demarcations between responsibilities
for call delivery, call processing, and radio dispatch. This will provide
more opportunities for competitive supply of the different elements of
the system. Accordingly, in contrast to the current model, we believe
that this transition to a more open and competitive system will introduce
opportunities and incentives to innovate that do not exist under and are
greatly limited by today's antiquated technological architecture.
94
B. The Current System of Collecting, Remitting, Allocating, and
Using 9-1-1 Funds
Much is misunderstood about the world of 9-1-1 funding. This is
not surprising as 9-1-1 funding is often a complicated matter within
individual states, and the myriad different approaches taken by different
jurisdictions collectively creates a convoluted picture for policymakers
and legislators who are not closely familiar with the area.
This Section aims to reduce this confusion. To do so, we divide the
funding process into four parts: a collection stage (what amounts
marked for 9-1-1 are collected and from what services?), a remittance
stage (what agency(ies) do service providers remit amounts collected for
9-1-1?), an allocation stage (once 9-1-1-related proceeds have been
remitted to an agency, to which entities do collected monies go prior to
93. By "selective router functionality," we mean to distinguish the selective router
function from the actual devices which we today commonly refer to as "selective routers." In
the Internet Protocol world, the functionality of the selective router will not be performed by
one of today's selective routers, but instead will be performed by a device that simply
accomplishes that function. (The terminology here is somewhat confused by the fact that the
original selective router was itself a switch--not a router. In any event, when the functionaLity
is moved to an Internet Protocol network, we anticipate that NG9-1-1 networks will actually
use a device properly called a router).
94. As a general matter, Harvard's Berkman Center makes a strong case for open systems
which facilitate competition and interoperability. Policymakers should consider this broader
perspective in adopting NG9-1-1 standards and requirements. See BERKMAN CENTER FOR
INTERNET & SOCIETY, ROADMAP FOR OPEN ICT ECOSYSTEMS 9-10 (2005), available at
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/epolicy/roadmap.pdf.
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being spent?), and a usage stage (i.e., once an entity has 9-1-1 funds for
expenditure, how are such monies used?). This description is set forth in
Figure 9 below.









































We recognize that this depiction is a simplification and that these
four stages are not always present. For example, sometimes a
governmental entity to which funds are remitted also determines how
such funds will be used. Under these circumstances, the remittance stage
is effectively combined with allocation. As we shall see, however, it is
often the case that-following remittance to an entity-9-1-1 monies
are first routed to a different government entity prior to final usage,
making the four stage approach a more effective way to understand 9-1-1
funding.
1. 9-1-1 Fund Collection
Sources for 9-1-1 funding vary along vertical levels of government
(e.g., municipality, county, regional, state, and federal). In general, there
are four principal funding sources that support 9-1-1: (1) direct end-user
surcharges; (2) state-level general funding sources (which ultimately flow
from taxes); (3) local, county, or regional-level funding sources (such as
proceeds from gross receipts taxes or property taxes); and (4) federal
funding sources (especially grant initiatives). Among these sources, the
most common and dedicated funding source for 9-1-1 services is end-
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user surcharges, where an amount is directly assessed to telephony
services to help pay for 9-1-1-related costs. As reflected in Figure 10
below, there are at least three salient dimensions to surcharges.
Figure 10: Important Considerations Concerning 9-1-1
Surcharges
1. What services 2. By what 3. After an end-user
are subject to method and for [ t pays the surcharge to
end-user 9-1-1 how much is a service provider, to
surcharge? the surcharge what agency (or
calculated? agencies) are
surcharge amounts remitted?
With respect to the first dimension of Figure 10, whether a 9-1-1
surcharge is assessed depends on the communications service involved
and the jurisdiction. Not surprisingly, as the legacy model of 9-1-1
funding, end-user surcharges are almost always assessed on wireline
telephone connections. Additionally, surcharges on wireless calls are
increasingly common: 47 states permit wireless surcharge. Finally, VolP
surcharges are present in 15 states.9" Moreover, even for jurisdictions
which do not yet mandate that VoIP assess 9-1-1 surcharges, our
interviews found that VoIP providers have often reached voluntary
agreements with local or regional entities to pay the equivalent of 9-1-1
surcharges.
With respect to the second dimension of Figure 10, two prevailing
methods of calculation, flat fee or percentage, are utilized. Most
jurisdictions require a flat fee payment into 9-1-1 funds, although at least
six states use a percentage formula to determine wireline fees. Under a
flat fee method, irrespective of the amount of use, each user of the
telephone service in the same jurisdiction pays an equal amount as each
other user into the 9-1-1 fund. For example, in Newark, New Jersey, a
wireline telephony user pays 90¢ per month. Similarly, a wireless
telephony user in Newark also pays 90¢ per month. It is not always the
case, however, that wireline and wireless surcharges are uniform in a
jurisdiction. In Kentucky, for example, a wireless user pays 70¢ per
month while a wireline user pays 25¢ per month. In contrast, other end-
user surcharges are assessed on a percentage basis. For example, in
Louisiana, wireline users pay up to 5% of tariffed rates for local telephone
basic service.
End-user surcharges amounts vary considerably between different
95. Vermont is unique insofar as it uses Universal Service Fund proceeds for E9-1-1
funding. Moreover, all statistics and amounts cited in this Part IV.B are based on research as
of October 2007.
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jurisdictions. Wireline surcharges range from 25¢ per month to $3 per
month; wireless surcharges range from 20¢ per month to $3 per month.
While this variation between jurisdictions is perhaps surprising on its
face, end-user surcharges cannot be examined in isolation. Although the
end-user surcharge is significant, it is only one potential input into 9-1-1
funding. Accordingly, an apples-to-apples comparison concerning
amounts of 9-1-1 funding between jurisdictions must comprehensively
look at end-user surcharges in combination with other categories of
funding sources such as state-level general funding sources, local funding,
and federal grants.
2. Remittance of 9-1-1 Funds
As to the third dimension of Figure 10 above, monies are usually
remitted to a government agency after they are collected by a service
provider. In some cases, a service provider is entitled to keep a
percentage of the collected funds as an administrative fee, such as in
Tennessee where wireless providers retain 3% of collected amounts. As
for the remitted funds, they typically go to a local or state-level entity.
Notably, local agencies receiving the 9-1-1 monies can vary among
government entities lower than the state level (municipal, city, county or
regional). Similarly, the state agency to which 9-1-1 monies are remitted
vary as well and may include a state-level 9-1-1 board, a treasury office,
or a public utilities commission.
96
The traditional model of 9-1-1 surcharges featured a monopoly
local service provider remitting funds into a local agency. This model
still remains the prevailing approach today, but the trend is toward
greater involvement of state entities in the remittance stage. Indeed, at
least 20 states now have a funding scheme which features a significant
state role whereby 9-1-1 wireline surcharges are remitted to the state
agency. Moreover, all but eleven states have wireline, wireless, or both
types of carriers remit funds to a state agency. Finally, several states have
a hybrid solution where some amounts are remitted to a state agency
while others are paid into local entities.
Consider, for example, Washington State as an illustration of a
hybrid approach. In Washington, 25¢ of wireline and wireless fees are
paid to a state-level entity while 50¢ of wireline and wireless fees go to
county entities. This type of division is hardly unique as our research
indicates that 20 states currently have a hybrid approach to collection in
place where at least some carriers remit to state entities while the same or
other carriers remit to local agencies. As elaborated upon in Section B,
we suggest that in order to promote administrative efficiency and
96. See GAO STATES' COLLECTION REPORT, supra note 54, at 16.
[Vol. 6
THE FUTURE OF 9-1-1
fairness, states should migrate toward a unified state-level collection
process where surcharges are in place.
3. Allocation of 9-1-1 Funds
The allocation stage is a crucial one: once 9-1-1-funds are collected,
they are frequently distributed to other governmental entities prior to the
point in which monies are used for purchases and expenditures.
Sometimes the collecting entity is also the purchasing entity, in which
case the allocation stage is effectively combined with the remittance
stage. A more common scenario, however, entails shifting around the 9-
1-1 related funds prior to usage.
For an example of that scenario, consider the model used by the
Tennessee Emergency Communications Board ("TECB"). The TECB
was formed in 1998 to promote wireless E9-1-1 services as well as assist
local entities known in Tennessee as Emergency Communications
Districts ("ECDs") on management, operations, and accountability
matters. 97 Moreover, it is also empowered to oversee the state's 9-1-1
Emergency Communications Fund ("9-1-1 ECF"). To support this
fund, wireless carriers collect $1 per month surcharges that are remitted
once every two months to the 9-1-1 ECF, subject to 3% which the
carrier keeps as an administrative fee.
The TECB allocates the relevant funds through a complex system.98
First, 25% of the total fund is distributed to ECDs based on district's
proportion of total population. Second, the TECB uses the fund to pay
its own operating costs and expenses. Third, ECDs are reimbursed for
expenditures related to implementation, operation, or enhancement of
wireless E9-1-1. Fourth, wireless service providers are reimbursed for
expenditures related to implementation, operation, or enhancement of
wireless E9-1-1. Fifth, if there are still unspent funds, they may be used
by the TECB to provide for grants to ECDs related to operating and
capital expenditures. Finally, once wireless E9-1-1 is achieved, the
TECB must distribute funds back to ECDs if the TECB believes that
such distribution will not threaten the solvency of the 9-1-1 ECF.
As suggested by the Tennessee example, an important aspect of the
allocation stage concerns the formulas by which funds remitted to an
agency are in turn allocated. A variety of methods are used in
determining which entity is entitled to a given amount of money,
97. See TENNESSEE ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL
RELATIONS, EMERGENCY CHALLENGE: A STUDY OF E-911 TECHNOLOGY AND
FUNDING STRUCTURE IN TENNESSEE 72 (2006) [hereinafter TACIR E-911 STUDY],
available athttp://www.state.tn.us/tacir/PDFFILES/OtherIssues/E911%20funding.pdf.
98. Id. at 67-68.
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including the population of an area for which the entity is responsible, an
entity's prior expenses, call volume, and an entity's prospective budget
requests. For example, Virginia recently changed its Wireless E9-1-1
Fund allocation scheme from one based on projected costs to a formula-
based method. Under Virginia's new approach to allocation of its
Wireless E9-1-1 Fund, monies are initially provided to the Division of
Public Safety Communications and Virginia Geographical Information
Network Division, reducing the amount of the Wireless E9-1-1 Fund.
Following this, the remaining amount in the Wireless E9-1-1 Fund is
allocated as follows: (1) 30% is allocated to wireless service providers for
cost recovery related to direct and reasonable costs for wireless E9-1-1
network deployment; (2) 60% is allocated to localities for PSAP's
recurring and non-recurring costs; and (3) 10% is allocated to a grant
program (to be implemented largely in 2008), whereby monies will be
allocated to localities with the most need. 99
As seen in Tennessee and Virginia, jurisdictions sometimes permit
cost recovery of service provider expenses, especially those of wireless
carriers, related to providing 9-1-1 services. While some jurisdictions
seem to have success with cost recovery programs, the concept of cost
recovery has an uneven record at best. Indeed, even where it is available,
cost recovery is not always utilized by commercial wireless carriers.
While the FCC initially required cost recovery in 1996 to promote
wireless E9-1-1 build out, it lifted that requirement in 1999.00
Nonetheless, many jurisdictions continue cost recovery programs in the
absence of the requirement.1 ' Based on our interviews, however, we
concluded that many wireless carriers eschew utilization of the cost
recovery mechanisms for at least two reasons. First, as a GAO report
noted in 2003, wireless carriers "might not seek to recoup costs incurred
with deploying E911 if they plan to use the location technologies for
99. VIRGINIA INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES AGENCY, Div. OF PUB. SAFETY
COMMC'NS, COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA: WIRELESS E9-1-1 SERVICES BOARD
FY2006 ANNUAL REPORT 6 (2006) [hereinafter VIRGINIA WIRELESS E9-1-1 2006
ANNUAL REPORT], available at
http://www.911.virginia.gov/wirelessreports/FY2006-AnnualReport.pdf. As to the grant
program, funds are available for "continuity" grants which help maintain existing PSAP
services as well as "enhancement" grants focused on improving E9-1-1 services. Id.
100. Revision of the Commission's Rules to Ensure Compatibility with Enhanced 911
Emergency Calling Sys., Second Memorandum Opinion & Order, 14 FCC Rcd. 20,850,
20,911 (1999).
101. Indeed, as of 2003, the GAO reported that 32 states and the District of Columbia
continued to provide some form of cost recovery. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
UNEVEN IMPLEMENTATION OF WIRELESS ENHANCED 911 RAISES PROSPECT OF
PIECEMEAL AVAILABILITY FOR YEARS TO COME 19-20 (2003), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0455.pdf.
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commercial purposes."1 °2 Second, some wireless carriers find it difficult
to recover costs for reasons either related to administrative burden or
incomplete recovery and instead elect to directly charge customers a fee
to help pay for wireless E9-1-1.
Amounts allocated to state and local agencies for 9-1-1 are
supplemented by other funding sources, including state level funds, local
sources, and federal grant and matching programs. These sources of
funding are further discussed in Part IV(C) below.
4. Usage of 9-1-1 Funds
The fourth and final funding stage, usage, concerns an agency's
expenditure of 9-1-1-related funds. Given the critical public function
performed by 9-1-1 services with limited resources, care should be given
to ensure that 9-1-1-related funds are used for their intended purposes.
So long as surcharges continue to play a central role in 9-1-1 funding," 3
policymakers owe an obligation to consumers to ensure that monies
earmarked for 9-1-1 are actually used for 9_1_1.104 In many cases, the
relevant problem is the diversion of 9-1-1 funds to other uses-i.e., the
so-called "raiding" of 9-1-1 funds. In some other cases, however, the
problem is that even though the 9-1-1 funds are used for legitimate
purposes, they are used to support "gold-plated" infrastructure that
cannot be justified as a prudent investment.
A well documented parade of horribles underscores that 9-1-1
funds are often seized for purposes that have little or nothing to do with
the services which are required to pay into 9-1-1 funds.105 Indeed,
Congress explicitly addressed raiding in passing the 2004 ENHANCE
9-1-1 Act, which tied distribution of federal grants to the requirement
that 9-1-1 funds be used only for 9-1-1-related expenditures.
Unfortunately, the 2004 Act has not been funded and this carrot has had
little effect on states to date. Our research and interviews confirmed that
raiding in various forms today remains a pervasive and endemic problem.
102. Id. at 20 n.22.
103. Over the long term, a migration to other funding models may be necessary in view
of industry trends which render uncertain an enduring reliance on the surcharge funding
model. See, e.g., NENA NG9-1-1 FUNDING REPORT, supra note 86, at 3. Moreover, since
9-1-1 benefits the general public and far more individuals than just the owners of telephony
devices, a greater general funding commitment would reflect sound policy. A challenge,
however, is to migrate to new funding models which prove reliable and adequate in amounts.
As industry players have opined to us, one salutary effect of the current funding model is that
today's system presents dedicated support for 9-1-1 that is at least to some degree reliable.
104. In addition to on-going examination of agencies' use of funds, future attention is
warranted concerning use of funds collected by ILECs for provision of E9-1-1 services.
Particularly where aged equipment is largely depreciated and cost allocation/auditing studies
are lacking, such a study could determine whether such funds are well used.
105. See GAO STATES' COLLECTION REPORT, supra note 54, at 16-18.
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Raiding is not just a problem from the perspective of supporting 9-
1-1, but also from a fiscal policy perspective because the bulk of 9-1-1
funding does not come from general public coffers. Significantly, so long
as large portions of 9-1-1 services are effectively supported by industry-
specific assessments, jurisdictions should be parsimonious concerning the
scope of permitted expenditures drawing upon these funds. After all,
communications services are valuable social goods that should not be
deterred by unnecessary added costs that distort and reduce the use of
these services. It is one thing to expect wireless carriers and their
customers to pay for elements and costs that they arguably impose upon
the 9-1-1 system in order to make Wireless E9-1-1 Phase II possible. It
is another matter, however, to use wireless surcharges to fund law
enforcement uniforms, which have little or no direct nexus with the
wireless services being assessed. 106
Indeed, when monies from surcharges are raided for non-9-1-1
purposes, there are at least four pernicious effects: (1) a weakened 9-1-1
system because dedicated 9-1-1 resources are used elsewhere; (2)
compromised government credibility as monies collected under
government authority are used for purposes different than stated for
collection; (3) an unfairness to providers and their subscribers insofar as
they involuntarily pay for public services that have little nexus to the
services which are assessed; and (4) unnecessary economic inefficiency
because optimal consumer use of the assessed communication services is
deterred by higher than necessary surcharges on those services.
It is critical that policymakers become more active in identifying
raiding and, once spotted, more vigilant in preventing it. Despite the
barbarian overtones of the "raiding" nomenclature, the practice of raiding
is not always overt and can be difficult to identify. Nonetheless, our
research identified at least three types of raiding that policymakers
should guard against: (1) a blatant fund sweep; (2) continued funding of
a completed project; and (3) misuse of funds. We address each point
below.
First, a blatant fund sweep is the easiest flavor of raiding to identify.
9-1-1 monies in state or local coffers are swept away and put to general
uses such as balancing governmental budgets or uses entirely unrelated to
public safety. A 2006 GAO report identified four states-Rhode Island
($9 million), North Carolina ($25 million), Virginia ($4.7 million) and
106. Daryl Bassett of the Arkansas Public Service Commission recently echoed this
perspective. "If you're going to tax a consumer for E911, the consumer should have a
reasonable expectation that the money is going to be spent on E911. Too many local
governments look at that as an income stream" and spend it elsewhere. Panel discussion,
CTIA Wireless I.T. & Entertainment (Oct. 2007) (reported by Brian Hammond) (on file
with author).
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Illinois ($254,000)-that raided wireless funds for other uses in 2005,
and seven states that did not respond to questions concerning raiding.' °7
Prior to that, a 2003 report pegged an estimated diversion of 9-1-1 funds
between 2001 and 2004 at over $400 million.' 8 In California alone, a
2004 State audit found that from 1981-2002, almost $177 million had
been transferred to the State's general fund but only $25 million had
been transferred back, a net raid of approximately $152 million.109
Moreover, a new law in North Carolina appears to virtually legislate
raiding. "0 Under the law, monies in individual PSAP's Emergency
Telephone System Funds as of the effective date, January 1, 2008, will be
transferred to the local government's General Fund "to be used for any
lawful purpose."' Collectively, the amount involved is estimated to be
between $5.5 and $6 million."'
Second, a more subtle version of raiding involves continued funding
of a completed project in which a project that begins as an appropriate
use of 9-1-1 monies continues past its intended completion. For
example, the Virginia State Police originally and properly received
allocations from Virginia's Wireless E9-1-1 Fund to compensate for
directly taking wireless E9-1-1 calls. It is no longer the case, however,
that the Virginia State Police directly takes such calls. Nonetheless,
under the State's Appropriations Act for 2006-08, the Virginia State
Police continues to receive $3.7 million despite the fact that the "original
justification for providing the funding to the State Police" has been
obviated.n 3  Not surprisingly, this effectively "reduces the amount of
funding available to the PSAPs and wireless service providers. ""'
And third, another less visible version of raiding involves misuse of
funds where, while not blatantly raided, 9-1-1 monies are nonetheless
diverted for uses with only a tenuous nexus to the original justification
107. GAO STATES' COLLECTION REPORT, supra note 54, at 18. Similarly, a 2005
Congressional Research Service report listed numerous instances of reported diversions cited in
a 2003 CTIA report, including a reported $207 million diverted in New York, $7 million in
Oregon, and $9.45 million in Washington D.C. See LINDA K. MOORE, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., AN EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS SAFETY NET: INTEGRATING 9-1-1 AND
OTHER SERVICES (2005), available athttp://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL32939.pdf.
108. MONITOR GROUP REPORT 1, supra note 55, at 11.
109. CALIFORNIA STATE AUDITOR, WIRELESS ENHANCED 911: THE STATE HAS
SUCCESSFULLY BEGUN IMPLEMENTATION, BUT BETTER MONITORING OF
EXPENDITURES AND WIRELESS 911 WAIT TIMES iS NEEDED 63 (2004), available at
http://www.bsa.ca.gov/pdfs/sr2006/2004-106.pdf.





113. VIRGINIA WIRELESS E9-1-1 2006 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 99, at 2.
114. Id. at 5.
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for their collection."' For example, in Oregon in 2007, an effort was
made to use $9 million of 9-1-1 tax revenue to fund wireless
communication interoperability planning and engineering activities.
While we agree that public safety interoperability presents an important
and laudable objective,' 1 6 the Oregon bill (SB 994) presents exactly the
type of diversion of 9-1-1 funds to a general public benefit for which
there is little direct nexus with the communications services being
assessed. Accordingly, Oregon's Governor, Theodore Kulongoski, acted
properly in vetoing the bill." 7
Another recent instance of misuse is found in Cabell County, West
Virginia. In August 2007, that county indicated its intention to move
forward with a plan to use money from the County's 9-1-1 and
Emergency Medical Service agencies to fund the bulk of a courthouse
pay raise. In so doing, it offered a highly tenuous rationale, reporting
that the funds would be used to "help the county recoup costs associated
with courthouse employees furnishing [public safety] agencies with
human resource, legal, purchasing, accounting, and payroll services." "'
In this same vein, a North Dakota performance audit reported that a
"number of PSAP locations were unable to justify the use of 911 fees for
115. At first, it is tempting to recommend wide-spread use of sunset provisions to guard
against continued funding of a completed project. However, caution should be exercised in
connection with such legislative provisions. Sunsets can be especially problematic when 9-1-1
goals are unmet at the end of the prescribed period and legislation comes up for renewal. For
example, Ohio's HB361 is ready to sunset despite achieving limited success concerning Phase
II deployment. In general, a more sound solution to guard against gratuitous funding of a
completed project is to require 'look back" provisions whereby an audit or report must be
issued to the legislature within a prescribed period of time. See NENA OHIO CHAPTER AND
APCO OHIO CHAPTER, POSITION PAPER: SUPPORTING THE REMOVAL OF THE
"SUNSET" PROVISION CONTAINED IN OHIO HOUSE BILL 361 at 2 (2007), available at
http://www.ohioapco.org/91lgoestocolumbus/positionpaper.pdf.
116. See, e.g., DALE N. HATFIELD &PHILIPJ. WEISER, A NEW VIEW: DEVELOPING
A WORKABLE NEXT-GENERATION NETWORK FOR PUBLIC SAFETY MEANS
RETHINKING ENTRENCHED IDEAS AND LOOKING TOWARD A FUTURE ROADMAP
(2007), available at http://www.silicon-
flatirons.org/documents/publications/policy/HatfieldWeiserPublicSafetyReport.pdf; BRAD
BERNTHAL, STEVE ROBERTSON &JUSTIN TURNER, COLLABORATIVE NETWORKS AND
THE ALASKA LAND MOBILE RADIO SYSTEM: A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING INTER-




117. In a statement, Governor Kulongoski explained: "I have vetoed the transfer of $9
million because it is important that funds collected from telecommunications customers for
enhancements to the 9-1-1 emergency response system to be used for the purposes established
in the applicable statutes." Press Release, Or. Governor's Office, Governor Kulongoski Issues
Vetoes for 2007 Legislative Session (Aug. 9, 2007), available at
http://istsmart.osl.state.or.us/pipermail/comm-council/2007-August/000814.html.
118. Curtis Johnson, PSC Attorney Sidesteps Cabell 911 Administrative Fee, HERALD
DISPATCH, Aug. 23, 2007.
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PSAP operations," and that improper uses included placement of
Christmas/holiday greeting ads in newspapers and sponsorship of
activities such as fire prevention, domestic violence, and farm safety." 9
C. Five Policy Recommendations for 9-1-1 Funding Going
Forward
This Section distills five recommendations related to 9-1-1 funding
based on our interviews, additional research, and analysis. At the outset,
we readily acknowledge that one size does not fit all in 9-1-1. For
example, a recommendation that fits well in Colorado may be ill-advised,
politically untenable, and perhaps contrary to existing law in Kentucky.
That said, on balance we envision and encourage increased
standardization and adoption of best practices across jurisdictions as 9-1-
1 continues its migration from an analog fixed telephone service into a
digital world characterized by mobility and diverse types of
communication services. The following recommendations related to 9-
1-1 funding aim to promote such a development.
1. 9-1-1 Services Must Be Better Aligned with the
Expectations and Demands of Consumers and Citizens
The historic success of the 9-1-1 system combined with aspects of
current analog infrastructure is the source of a gulf between consumer
assumptions about the system's robust capabilities and the system's actual
limitations. We found this to be a recurring theme acknowledged
throughout our interviews and research. In considering 9-1-1 funding,
consumer and citizen expectations should drive policymakers to adopt
funding models which meet public demands concerning emergency
services.
Specifically, there are three respects in which 9-1-1 system
performance currently fails to match consumer expectations. First,
consumers expect consistent 9-1-1 service across municipal, county, and
state jurisdictions. In contrast, the legacy 9-1-1 model yields an erratic
patchwork where crossing a county line may mean the difference
between Phase I location capability and no 9-1-1 service at all.
Consumers that pay the same amount in different parts of a state
reasonably expect comparable 9-1-1 service across jurisdictions or at least
receive a fair share of 9-1-1 service where their costs of service are higher.
Second, consumers expect consistent 9-1-1 service across different
communications technologies. "Consumers are generally unaware of the
119. NORTH DAKOTA STATE AUDITOR, PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT: 911 FEES
- COLLECTION AND USE 12-13 (2005) [hereinafter ND AUDITOR REPORT], available at
http://www.nd.gov/auditor/reports/3023-2-05.pdf.
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current limitations of 9-1-1 and expect to have the same service no
matter what type of telephone service they use, whether it is wireline,
wireless, or [VoIP]."'2° And third, as noted by Ohio's Bill Hinkle, many
consumers assume that virtually any technology that they utilize will
allow them to contact 9-1-1.12i As noted at the outset of the Article, a
high profile example of this is that students attempted to text message 9-
1-1 following the Virginia Tech shooting tragedy in spring 2007.
Largely due to 9-1-i's success in telephony, there are expectations that
emergency services should be able to handle a wide range of
communications technologies, including SMS text messaging, sending
pictures via cell phones, and the ability to call from behind private branch
exchanges. Of course, as explained in Part II, today's 9-1-1 systems
typically do not meet these expectations.
In short, policymakers must make a choice: either disabuse
consumers concerning emergency capabilities, which we do not advise, or
commit to provide the services that consumers have come to expect from
9-1-1, which we believe to be the better policy course. All too frequently
public safety 9-1-1 capabilities are impoverished compared to the
commercial communication networks that increasingly inform consumer
expectations concerning communications capabilities. Compared to
modern commercial networks, the status quo for 9-1-1 systems that use
analog emergency networks capable of carrying and receiving only voice
traffic is unacceptable. 22 As detailed above in Part III, the path to an
NG9-1-1 system is to view the 9-1-1 system as a common enterprise,
i.e., a network of networks, rather than local silos making autonomous
decisions. To be sure, there will continue to be an important role for
local decision-makers in 9-1-1 services. It is imperative, however, that
policymakers recognize that new system designs must be designed and
funded at higher than local levels in order to realize economies of scale,
technical expertise, and purchasing power concerning such networks.
2. Responsible Policymakers Must Have a Viable Funding
Strategy for Achieving Next Generation 9-1-1
In the near term, a policymaker's most urgent challenge is to
120. NGA ISSUE BRIEF, supra note 82, at 1.
121. Telephone Interview with Bill Hinkle, Dir. of Commc'ns, Hamilton County Dep't
of Commc'ns, in Cincinnati, Ohio (Aug. 8, 2007).
122. One individual actively involved in state-level 9-1-1 affairs identified a common
attitude toward PSAP equipment as "install it and ignore it." Moreover, the same official
noted that networks and equipment are frequently bundled and the 9-1-1 systems provider will
use its ownership position to prevent deployment of a rival network. Additionally, equipment
may be subject to multi-year lease arrangements preventing upgrades, and legacy systems have
not been upgraded for up to 20 years.
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evaluate whether existing funding strategies within his/her respective
jurisdiction are sufficient to enable build-out and operation of next
generation 9-1-1 services. Indeed, as NENA President Jason Barbour
has noted, "Perhaps the most important policy issue today and into the
next generation is funding. "123
To be sure, this is easier said than done. From a national
perspective, the diversity of funding models across jurisdictions means
that the sufficiency of funds to support 9-1-1 can only be determined on
a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction basis. Notably, starkly different resources
are available in different states and, frequently, between localities within
a state. This fragmented approach has made some pessimistic about
current models. "[R]elying on the current patchwork 9-1-1 funding
model is not sufficient to maintain the current 9-1-1 system, let along
provide for the essential evolution to NG9-1-1."124 Moreover, there
appear to be wildly divergent visions of what functionalities will
constitute next generation 9-1-1, ranging from simple e-mail access to a
fully IP-based system. Finally, from the perspective of individuals
responsible for a jurisdiction's 9-1-1 services, the emergence of new
technologies help "make providing the most efficient E-911 services a
constantly moving fiscal target. "125
For many jurisdictions, often overlooked in considering whether 9-
1-1 funding is sufficient is a critical predicate: sufficient for what?
Prescient states and localities are taking up the task of answering this
question. For example, Indiana's Wireless Advisory Board has led the
way in planning and achieving a next generation system which permits
packet delivery of wireless calls.126 Missouri, which has traditionally
lagged in many aspects of 9-1-1 service and reportedly has 21 counties
still without even basic 9-1-1 recently commissioned an IP-based system
study that carefully examines current 9-1-1 infrastructure in Missouri as
well as provides recommendations for a statewide IP-Enabled
Network.127 Developing an analysis of current capabilities, future needs,
and strategies to bridge the two is a critical first step for jurisdictions to
complete.
In conjunction with future needs and strategy, our second
recommendation focuses on the need for a method to evaluate whether
123. NENA NG9-1-1 FUNDING REPORT, supra note 86, at 2.
124. Id. at 4.
125. TACIR E-911 STUDY, supra note 97, at 72.
126. Telephone Interview with Ken Louden, Executive Dir., Ind. Enhanced Wireless
911 Bd., in Indianapolis, Ind. (Aug. 2, 2007).
127. See L. ROBERT KIMBALL & ASSOCIATES, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A
MISSOURI STATEWIDE IP-ENABLED NETWORK SUBMITTED TO THE STATE OF
MISSOURI (2006) [hereinafter L. ROBERT KIMBALL & Assoc. MISSOURI
RECOMMENDATIONS], available athttp://www.911 .oa.mo.gov/pdffdes/Report2.pdf.
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9-1-1 funding is sufficient. In this respect, we suggest that policymakers
evaluate a series of issues. First, they should consider whether the
current funding level is sufficient to achieve and support NG9-1-1
systems-with respect to both recurring and non-recurring costs.
Second, they should evaluate whether existing funding mechanisms
support 9-1-1 services in a manner that fairly matches the expectations,
demands, and communications usage patterns of consumers and citizens.
Third, they should assess whether existing funding and cost-recovery
policies promote vendor and service-provider competition in 9-1-1
services in both pricing and innovation without compromising safety and
while minimizing unnecessary market distortions.
In order to transition effectively to an NG9-1-1 system,
policymakers cannot be nive about funding requirements. To be clear,
the NG9-1-1 system must be understood as a value proposition, not a
cost savings measure. While there may be efficiencies and cost savings
involved in an NG9-1-1 system, it is possible-indeed, in the near term,
highly likely-that funding requirements for NG9-1-1 system will be
greater than current 9-1-1 system costs. Specifically, at least four
different types of costs will be required in connection with the move to
an NG9-1-1 system: (1) capital expenditures involved in building out a
new system; (2) transitional costs, i.e., expenses involved in using the old
9-1-1 system while the new system is phased in; (3) costs of network
security and encryption requirements associated with a competitive, IP-
based system; and (4) on-going recurring costs of an NG9-1-1 system,
which will likely need to account for shorter lifespan of products than
traditional network pieces.
The challenge of analyzing the adequacy of available funding
strategies involves three steps. First, states need to develop a baseline of
existing funding amounts based on the currently used mechanisms in
order to "benchmark the existing structure." 128 Notably, this step must
consider the various funding sources detailed in Section B above,
including surcharges, amounts from state and local general funds, grant
programs, and other relevant sources. Second, states need to consider
the relevant market trends so that they can evaluate the likely changes in
current funding sources. Consider, for example, that consumer behavior
such as adoption of VoIP telephony services and wireless substitution for
wireline services all impact the viability of current funding sources.
And third, policymakers must identify a desired level of service of
performance for a next generation system. For example, Massachusetts'
Statewide Emergency Telecommunications Board established technical
and operational requirements for PSAPs which in turn helped the state
128. NENA VOIP OLD REPORT, supra note 89, at 12.
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"establish a baseline to determine where resources are needed. "129  As
detailed in Part II, we believe that the basic architecture to deliver
advanced functionalities should be an IP-based next generation system.
Such a vision provides a divining factor in determining the costs which
must be incurred by PSAPs and by service providers both on a recurring
and non-recurring basis in order to reach the prescribed standard of
service.
3. The Public Good Nature of 9-1-1 Today Suggests That
9-1-1 Funding Models Should Be Augmented by
Financing That Facilitate Capital Expenditures
Consistent with the perspective that 9-1-1 is a "public good,"
policymakers should view an NG9-1-1 system as a critical infrastructure
which must be valued by the public and supported as such. 130  One
challenge for funding a next generation network, which is generally not
addressed by current funding strategies, is the ability to borrow or save
funds for future capital upgrades. Stressing that point, another report
recently opined, "funding mechanisms must be crafted that allow 9-1-1
administrators to amass a capital reserve for deployment of a new IP
based 9-1-1 infrastructure."13' Accordingly, state and federal grants,
bonds, lines of credit, and other tools should be appropriately considered
to support build-out of NG9-1-1 systems. 132 State recognition of capital
129. NGA ISSUE BRIEF, supra note 82, at 6. Similarly, a recent Tennessee study echoed
this theme: the "development of standards should provide a means to determine the costs and
necessary revenue to provide a minimum level of service statewide." TACIR E-911 STUDY,
supra note 97, at 13.
130. Indeed, Executive Order documents have characterized emergency services as
"critical infrastructure." For example, Executive Order No. 13010, 61 Fed. Reg. 37,347 (July
15, 1996), includes emergency services as among the nation's critical infrastructure. SeeJOHN
MOTEFF & PAUL PARFOMAK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
AND KEY ASSETS: DEFINITION AND IDENTIFICATION (2004), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/RL32631.pdf.
131. NENA VOIP OlD REPORT, supra note 89, at 18.
132. As discussed above, in addition to general sources, funding for our emergency
response network relies heavily on surcharges on telephone bills. We do not see this changing
in the near future and recognize that, if nothing else, properly managed surcharges provide a
dedicated source of funds for 9-1-1. However, reliance on this model in the long term is
problematic. As one report put, it the "current financing paradigm for the 9-1-1 system
operations will likely prove inadequate in the future." RESEARCH & INNOVATIVE TECH.
ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., NEXT GENERATION 9-1-1 SYSTEM: PRELIMINARY
CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 6 (2005), available at
http://www.its.dot.gov/ng911/pdf/Con0ps.pdf. For example, as two industry participants
separately relayed to us, falling rates for telephone service (which some observers view as
inevitable) may well lead states to adopt flat fees. To be sure, flat fees do provide greater
predictability in the short term, but it is also quite possible that, over the long term, user
behavior will continue to change and move toward applications with lower or non-existent 9-
1-1 surcharges (say, instant messaging). Moreover, it is unfortunate that the funding source is,
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expenditures necessary to support 9-1-1 is not without precedent. For
example, New Jersey in 1991 launched a $94 million lease-purchase
agreement program entitled Certificate of Participation ("COP"). The
COP program enabled build-out of the State's original 9-1-1
infrastructure.'33 Six years later, in 1997, New Jersey again recognized
the need for upgrades and approved a $4.7 million line of credit. 3 4 In
short, as evidenced in New Jersey, the model we recommend is one
where the state self-consciously suggests strategies for prudent fiscal
management that includes a concept of capital expenditures.
Even though local entities should continue to retain control over
their 9-1-1 operations, collection of 9-1-1 monies must increasingly
occur at the state level in order to facilitate the finding of capital
expenditures and the coordination of system build-outs. As emphasized
in Part III, achieving an enterprise approach to next generation 9-1-1
systems will require the ability to collect funds at higher level in order to
make coordinated network design decisions, capture economies of scale,
and realize purchasing power. Moreover, our research found that at least
three further reasons militate in favor of this approach. In particular,
higher level collection promotes: (1) administrative efficiency by reducing
costs related to jurisdictional patchworks for service providers;
(2) equitable standards of 9-1-1 services across jurisdictions; and
(3) heightened accountability with respect to service provider
contributions as well as usage of 9-1-1-related funds. In an environment
where an empowered state agency can collect the funds, support localities
who are using them, and oversee those localities who do not play by the
rules, the level of confidence and effectiveness of the entire system will
rise considerably. Of course, the prevention of raiding is also critical to
such a system's efficacy.
in effect, a tax on communications. In general, society should restrict industry specific taxes to
behavior it wishes to discourage--say, smoking-and otherwise rely on general revenues
(raised from non-distortionary taxes). Consequently, where possible, policymakers should
investigate alternatives to a reliance on general taxes.
133. PROFILE OF THE NEWJERSEY E9-1-1 SYSTEM, supra note 71.
A COP is a lease-purchase agreement that provides for the acquisition of
equipment, services, and real property to be used by various departments and
agencies of the state. A COP represents a proportionate interest of the owner
thereof in the lease payments to be made by the state under the terms of the lease-
purchase agreement.
Id. at n.6.
134. Id. at 3. A line of credit makes an amount of money available to a borrower for a
specified duration of time.
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4. Greater Oversight Should Be Used to Monitor Fund
Collection, Deter 9-1-1 Funding Raids, and Ensure That
9-1-1 Purchases Reflect Sound Judgment
In many cases, the system of 9-1-1 funding has operated on
"autopilot" with too little planning and oversight of the relevant players.
Raiding continues to be a significant problem for 9-1-1 funding. And
either to avoid the blatant fund sweeps or the possible threat of cutting
funding levels, some jurisdictions continue to use 9-1-1 funds for other
purposes. There is, of course, an irony here: the threat of state raiding 9-
1-1 funds encourages unproductive behavior on the local level. And, to
top it off, there are incidents where carriers-perhaps believing that the
system has sufficient funding, perhaps just on account of sloppy
accounting, or even reflecting efforts to cheat the fund-fail to collect
and remit the requisite amount.
We found that misallocation and misuse of 9-1-1 funds present
important funding challenges for most jurisdictions. Aside from these
problems, the majority of individuals interviewed as well as the majority
of publicly available state reports suggest that current funding models
appear generally sufficient to sustain the status quo of their 9-1-1
systems. To be sure, this is very much a case-by-case determination
specific to individual jurisdictions and we found several areas in which
funding is regularly insufficient to maintain existing levels of 9-1-1
service. In particular, areas which rely heavily on wireline surcharges are
experiencing difficulty as wireless and VoIP substitution results in lower
wireline revenues. Additionally, rural areas with smaller fee bases
commonly struggle and, in the absence of grant programs or outside
assistance, rural localities often lag in E9-1-1 service. Finally, high call
volume in areas where mobile traffic is frequent-such as along
interstates and in tourist destinations populated by out-of-state
residents-often burdens a jurisdiction's 9-1-1 services. This reflects
that mobile telephony is problematic for existing surcharge models:
mobility partitions the location from which a call is made from the
address where a surcharge is collected. This is important for high-
mobile call volume jurisdictions because traditional surcharge models do
not provide for contributions from 9-1-1 callers who live outside their
jurisdiction.
Significantly, we find that more must be done to insert safeguards
into the 9-1-1 funding system to improved vigilance against (1) under
collection of funds and (2) misuse of funds. We address each issue in
turn.
Not surprisingly, administration of surcharge payments into the 9-
1-1 system is more complicated today than during the monopoly era
when fewer players and technologies were involved. Today, given the
2008]
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proliferation of telecommunications services and an expanding range of
players, tracking collection of 9-1-1 surcharge payments presents a
growing challenge. Of course, the fragmented nature of local collection
compounds the difficulty of ascertaining the relevant funding levels. For
example, in our interviews one state official reported that his state
formed a committee which approved a CPA firm to collect information
on wireline revenues collected by counties, but only half of the state's
counties responded. Overall, jurisdictions must address the challenge of
tracking funds in order to ensure a level competitive playing field for
providers as well as ensuring that the 9-1-1 system receives the funding
which policymakers intended.
A 2007 audit in Oregon underscores the lack of controls currently in
place. In that case, the auditors found that revenue officials simply did
not have a proper process to verify whether telephone providers paid 9-1-
1 amounts due. In particular, the audit estimated that as a consequence
Oregon may have failed and continues to fail to collect as much as $4
million per year in amounts due from telephone carriers.' Notably, the
audit indicated that the problem is not limited to Oregon: "The issue of
9-1-1 revenue reporting and remittance is receiving increased attention
nationwide. For example, officials from... [several states] expressed
concern regarding the accuracy and completeness of the 9-1-1 revenue
collected in their states."'36
As the Oregon report suggests, other states have similar problems.
In North Dakota, for example, the state has had difficulty monitoring
telecommunications providers who withheld excess administrative costs
and, as a result, underpaid 9-1-1 fees at the remittance stage.
137
Moreover, a New Hampshire performance audit determined that the
State's Bureau of Emergency Communications ("BEC"), which performs
a critical role in the State's 9-1-1 system, is deficient in "collection and
tracking of surcharge payments.""' In particular, the New Hampshire
audit identified three recommendations. First, the State should require
that companies use a standardized reporting document to be submitted
with monthly surcharge payments. This would allow the State to better
identify companies using an improper methodology in calculating
surcharge amounts. Second, the State should consistently track
payments from companies because, under the BEC's approach, it could
135. Oregon 9-1-1 Phone Tax Payments Fal Short, ARGUS OBSERVER, Sept. 27, 2007,
available athttp://www.argusobserver.com/articles/2007/09/27/news/07.txt.
136. OR. SEC Y OF STATE, OREGON DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE: 9-1-1 TAX
REVIEW 4 (2007), available at http://www.sos.state.or.us/audits/reports/fuiU/2007/200 7 -
23.pdf. The audit specifically cited similar concerns from officials in Delaware, New York,
Minnesota, and Arizona. Id. at 4-5.
137. ND AUDITOR REPORT, supra note 119, at 18.
138. N.H. PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT, supra note 43.
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"not be certain for which months companies have or have not submitted
surcharge payments."139 Third, where companies fail to make proper
surcharge contributions, there must be enforcement capabilities. For
example, two companies went a year without making payments and,
without an enforcement mechanism such as late fees or penalties, this
can be seen as a rational strategy because "there is little incentive for
companies to submit timely payments."14 °
In addition to ensuring that proper contributions are made in
connection with the collection and remittance stages, it is important to
guard against misuse of funds at the usage stage. Notably, we found a
number of strategies available to policymakers to guard against misuse of
funds problems. One strategy involves development of a unified system
of reporting and accounting for review of local expenditures. For
example, Tennessee has adopted a uniform financial accounting system
developed by the Comptroller of the Treasury that local Emergency
Communications Districts use in connection with annual reports. 1 ' The
accounting system's review is backed by meaningful consequences: if
local districts are found in violation of state law or not acting in good
faith, wireless distributions may be withheld.142
A second strategy involves providing greater guidance concerning
usage of funds. At least in writing, most jurisdictions have criteria
setting forth how 9-1-1 funds may be used.'43 Such guidelines have
varying levels of specificity, ranging from the vague to highly prescriptive.
Guidelines also vary concerning the scope of what may be used with 9-1-
1 funds and some guidelines are clearly wanting. In North Dakota, for
example, a state audit found "a lack of adequate guidance provided to
political subdivisions on what 911 fees are to be used for or what they
should not be used for. Improvements are needed to ensure that the use
of 911 fees comply with legislative intent."a" In contrast, Montana today
sets forth Basic and Enhanced 9-1-1 Funding Guidelines that determine
budget items eligible for funding. 45
Written guidelines such as Montana's are valuable insofar as they
provide clear guidance and transparency concerning how 9-1-1 funds are
139. Id. at 29.
140. Id. at 30.
141. TACIR E-911 STUDY, supra note 97, at 25.
142. Id.
143. GAO STATES' COLLECTION REPORT, supra note 54, at 16 (noting that 35
jurisdictions out of 44 responding claimed to have written policies governing use of 9-1-1
funds).
144. ND AUDITOR REPORT, supra note 119, at 11.




J ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L.
allocated and used. In Montana's case, they specify a series of categories
that are eligible for support through E9-1-1 funds.14 6 First, they support
PSAP Operation, such the telephone system for the PSAP capable of
handling required 9-1-1 trunks and non-emergency lines, the installation
and recurring costs for 9-1-1 trunks and non-emergency lines, radio
frequency coordination, software and hardware for computer aided
dispatch ("CAD"), computer hardware and software used by call takers
and/or radio dispatchers, and PSAP's share of records management
system ("RMS") software. Second, they call for support for E9-1-1
related budget items for development, installation, and operation of the
E9-1-1 system, such as, among other things, telephone equipment which
can handle and display E9-1-1 database information, costs to develop
and maintain the Master Street Address Guide ("MSAG") and E9-1-1
database, project manager costs, and costs associated with providing
wireless E9-1-1 services. Third, they authorize support for dispatch
related budget items to enable dispatch, relay, or transfer of calls for
emergency service. Finally, they allow the funds to be used for other
justifiable costs, including training for PSAP telecommunicators, PSAP
building requirements, public education, salaries, and addressing.
In addition to restrictions on permitted uses of funds, another
notable type of guidance strategy includes offering assistance concerning
what funds should be used for. "Many states and national organizations
provide education and outreach to PSAPs to help them identify their
equipment upgrade needs."147  Several jurisdictions offer technical
consulting to assist selection of what should be purchased with funds.
For example, Washington offers technical assistance concerning
equipment and system integration.'48 Virginia supports PSAPs project
management, consulting, and training.'49  Overall, such technical
assistance which helps train and provide expertise is important. In New
Mexico, for example, an after-action report studied lessons learned in
connection with achieving state-wide addressing for E9-1-1. 50 Despite
a state grant providing for purchase of technology solutions, the report
noted the disparity of local project manager skills and determined that
geographic information systems "were not solutions. Instead, reliable
146. Id.
147. NGA ISSUE BRIEF, supra note 82, at 7.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. DAVID HANNA, ASSISTANT DIR. LOCAL GOV'T DIV., N.M. DEP'T OF FIN. &
ADMIN., STATEWIDE ADDRESSING FOR ENHANCED 9-1-1: LESSONS LEARNED IN NEW
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people trained to use the technology were the solution."' 51
5. 9-1-1 Surcharges Should Be Assessed in a Principled
Manner That Promotes Competition
Irrespective of method of calculation, an additional finding of our
research concerns how jurisdictions determine the amount of a surcharge.
For example, it is fair to ask why a particular jurisdiction's VoIP
surcharge is $.75 instead of, say, $1.25 or just $.25. Our research
indicates that many surcharge amounts, especially relating to wireless and
VoIP amounts, are the result of political compromise and wild
guesswork. This certainly does not need to be the case. A jurisdiction
could instead assess surcharges based on a variety of principles, including
how much cost a user or service imposes upon the overall 9-1-1 system,
on the basis of technology neutrality (i.e., ensure that wireline, wireless,
and VoIP charges are the same), or perhaps on the basis of what is
needed in the way of overall 9-1-1 funding.
Our research did not find that these or other principled approaches
prevailed in anchoring many 9-1-1 surcharge determinations. Indeed, as
one official reported, the relevant charges were often the results of
political compromise or just "pulled out of thin air." Unfortunately,
where surcharge amounts reflect guesswork and political compromise,
they needlessly distort competitive forces. Accordingly, in connection
with the migration to an NG9-1-1 world, we recommend that
surcharges be informed by a policy of equity and then parity. That is, to
the extent that a particular service-say, wireless phones-imposes
unique costs upon the 9-1-1 system, equity dictates that that particular
service should pay for the respective cost it imposes on the system. Once
a call reaches the part of the 9-1-1 system where unique costs are no
longer imposed, however, parity dictates that different services should
pay the same amount to fund such common costs. In this manner, we
believe that a principled approach to 9-1-1 will reduce unnecessary
market distortions and introduce greater fairness into the system.
CONCLUSION
Our current system of emergency communications has failed to
keep pace with technology and does little more than its original
aspiration-providing a single number to contact emergency services.
This is an admittedly valuable service and our 9-1-1 system has most
certainly saved lives and protected property using this system for almost
forty years. It has not, however, evolved effectively as technological
151. Id.
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change-particularly related to the transition from analog to digital,
fixed to mobile, and narrowband (voice-optimized) to broadband (data-
optimized) communications-has transformed our system of
telecommunications.
The opportunity to upgrade our system of 9-1-1 communications is
not merely a compelling opportunity. It is a national imperative. As we
have emphasized, the public generally expects to be able to reach 9-1-1
using an array of modern technologies, from the ability to email pictures
using mobile phones to VoIP technologies to text messaging. As a
technical matter, it is not difficult to upgrade the 9-1-1 system in such a
manner, making it not only more effective but also more efficient and
reliable. The key question, therefore, is when policymakers will enact the
necessary reforms in governance and funding to make that transition
possible. Given the powerful case for this transition, and widespread
awareness of the need to make it,152 there is little reason to delay.
152. As one survey of state administrators reports: "They understand that they must do
this now or face the prospect of having a 9-1-1 system that is essentially broken, unable to
handle calls from communications technologies that the public is already using, not to mention
future technologies." L. ROBERT KIMBALL & ASSOC. MISSOURI RECOMMENDATIONS,
supra note 127, at 2.
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